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Since the 1990s, many sub-Saharan African 
countries have promulgated statutory water laws 
that include nationwide permit systems promoted 
as global best practices. However, significant 
challenges have emerged. Permit systems widen 
inequalities and their implementation is logistically 
impossible. This report traces the causes of 
these challenges back to the colonial roots of 
permit systems with the aim of identifying the 
colonial ‘wrongs’ that need to be removed and 
the ‘rights’ to be taken forward in a way that 
there is alignment with the water authorities’ 
current practices. The proposed hybrid approach 
recognizes living customary law and targets 
regulatory permits at the relatively few formal, 
high-impact water users.
The report starts by analyzing how inequalities 
are widening because permits, or exemptions 
below a certain threshold, are the sole way to 
legalize water use, as prescribed by the water 
legislation. This overrides the widespread living 
customary water rights regimes, which, since 
time immemorial, have governed investments 
in water infrastructure for self-supply and water 
sharing by, currently, millions of small-scale and 
micro-scale water users in Africa’s informal rural 
economies. On top of ignoring these water rights, 
the micro-scale water users who are exempted 
from the obligation to apply for a permit are 
categorically marginalized because exempted 
uses have a weaker legal standing than permitted 
water uses. Small-scale users who are obliged to 
apply for permits - at disproportionately high costs 
relative to large users - are de jure criminalized 
without a permit. Yet, the high administrative 
burdens of permit systems prohibit states from 
informing the large numbers of small-scale 
users and processing their applications. This is 
an administrative injustice. At the same time, 
the relatively few permits with their superior 
entitlements that have been issued remain 
heavily biased towards formal large users with the 
highest impacts on other water users and aquatic 
ecosystems. 
Focusing on Malawi, Kenya, South Africa, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe, the report identifies 
the causes of these challenges in the colonial 
introduction of permit systems in the early 1900s. 
These laws claimed colonial ownership of water 
resources, mainly surface water at the time, 
and issued permits to settlers only. This vested 
superior water entitlements in the settlers. The 
conditions tied to permits provided the newly 
established colonial water authority with useful 
hydrological and technical information about new 
terrains, and included fees for cost recovery. 
The legislation recognized African customary 
water rights regimes but declared an inferior 
entitlement. Thus, permit systems served the 
colonial government’s state building and settlers’ 
hydraulic mission in support of the minority 
colonial economy. 
After independence, colonial ownership shifted 
to custodianship by the new state. However, 
instead of recognizing living customary water law, 
permits and exemptions remained the single legal 
tool to define water uses as lawful. The informal 
small-scale users, who had been purposively 
excluded before, were suddenly subsumed under 
the permit system. Moreover, administrative 
burdens to  reach the fast -growing rura l 
populations rocketed even more in the subsequent 
legal revisions, which extended permits to include 
groundwater and a greater range of water-
related activities; increased conditions; shortened 
durations requiring more frequent renewals; 
lowered thresholds for exemptions; and intensified 
revenue collection, while initial donor funding for 
reforms and implementation dwindled. 
The report concludes by suggesting options 
to decolonize statutory water law through a hybrid 
approach. The ‘wrong’ of the past to be removed 
is that permits or exemptions are the exclusive 
tool for any water users to become lawful amidst 
legal pluralism. Instead, permit holders and 
small- and micro-scale non-permit holders should 
be given equal legal standing. Water allocation 
and conflict resolution during water scarcity and 
droughts, which are still rudimentary in current 
legislation, should be guided by a prioritization 
that reflects national goals, including local 
economic development and constitutional rights to 
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water for domestic and productive uses for basic 
well-being. Such a normative framework underpins 
two tools to implement the hybrid approach. 
First, permits should continue as a targeted 
and lean regulatory tool – not as an entitlement 
- to set and enforce water use conditions and 
fees on the relatively few formal users who use 
a finite national asset with highest impacts on 
other users and aquatic ecosystems. This implies 
transparent permit application procedures that 
protect potentially affected small- and micro-scale 
users and enable them to negotiate sharing of 
benefits or compensation. Second, in order to 
effectively prevent and resolve conflicts among 
the many medium-, small- and micro-scale users, 
states should recognize and build on the myriad 
living customary arrangements that align with 
national priorities and constitutional requirements. 
This hybrid approach with its tools is in line with 
current practices of permitting, is administratively 
lean, recognizes customary law and protects the 
most vulnerable. Instead of being entangled in 
concerns of getting a permit or not, the overdue 
concerns become: what are the ultimate goals that 
communities and states want to achieve through 
the regulation of precious water resources, and 
how best can that be realized? How can living 
customary arrangements contribute to that?
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A Hybrid Approach to Decolonize Formal Water Law 
in Africa
Barbara van Koppen and Barbara Schreiner
Introduction
Problem Statement 
Since the 1990s, many sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries have promulgated water laws 
based on the purported global best practice of 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
(cf. Mehta et al. 2017). These laws define the 
state as the custodian of most, if not all, of the 
nation’s water resources, and prescribe permits to 
abstract and use naturally available or ‘raw’ water 
legally. An exemption from the obligation to apply 
for a permit is granted for specified uses below 
certain thresholds, such as basic domestic uses 
and micro-scale productive uses, also called de 
minimis uses (Hodgson 2004). 
While implementation is gaining momentum, 
it is increasingly acknowledged that permit 
systems widen inequalities and bring extremely 
heavy administrative burdens to states. Current 
permit holders are still only a fraction of all 
water users obliged to apply for a permit and 
they are strongly biased towards the relatively 
few large users, such as large-scale irrigated 
farms, industries, mines, hydropower providers 
or municipalities. These users have the highest 
impacts on other water users and aquatic 
ecosystems. In contrast, the millions of small-
scale water users who directly abstract raw 
water are further marginalized in three forms. 
First, permit systems override the customary or 
informal1 water rights regimes that have governed 
their investments in water infrastructure for self-
supply and water sharing since time immemorial 
(Ramazotti 1996; Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya 2007; 
Bolding et al.1996; Makurira and Viriri 2017). 
These informal investments in infrastructure 
continue to expand (Woodhouse et al. 2017). For 
example, in Limpopo Province of South Africa, the 
area covered by informal, self-financed irrigation 
for self-supply is at least three times the area 
covered by public smallholder irrigation schemes 
(van Koppen et al. 2017a). For Ghana, Giordano 
et al. (2012) documented how private manual 
and motorized irrigation by smallholders employs 
45 times more individuals and covers 25 times 
more land than public irrigation schemes. These 
informal arrangements significantly contribute 
to broad-based agricultural growth and poverty 
alleviation, at no cost to the tax payer. 
Second,  permi t  sys tems marg ina l ize 
informal small-scale users by infringing on their 
constitutional rights of fair treatment (van Koppen 
et al. 2014). Small-scale water users who are 
obliged to apply for a permit, but have no permit, 
commit an offence which carries the potential 
penalty of being fined or jailed or both. Yet, water 
authorities lack the administrative capacities to 
reach millions of dispersed small-scale users 
without access to the internet, bank accounts 
or affordable transport. This is even the case 
in South Africa, which has a relatively well-
staffed water authority. Moreover, the country’s 
National Water Act of 1998 only requires permits 
(called licenses) for new water abstractions after 
1998. Water uses that were lawful under earlier 
legal regimes remain “Existing Lawful Uses” 
(ELUs) (RSA 1998). Nevertheless, even in South 
Africa, the second edition of the National Water 
Resource Strategy (DWA 2013a) admits, “Current 
licensing processes are often costly, very lengthy, 
1 The terms living customary, customary, informal, local, indigenous and community-based law are used interchangeably. They refer to the 
usually oral long-standing rules and practices that are seen as legitimate and binding (Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya 2007). 
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bureaucratic and inaccessible to many South 
Africans.” So, these small-scale users are obliged 
to apply for a permit and criminalized without a 
permit but practically unable to obtain a permit. 
Third, permit systems marginalize micro-scale 
water users who are exempted from the obligation 
to apply for a permit. They are categorically 
marginalized because the legal standing of 
exempted water users is weaker than that of 
permitted water users (Hodgson 2004; Burchi 
2012). These intrinsic features of permit systems 
in low-income countries with large agrarian 
populations are incompatible with the principles 
of equality and fair treatment (van Koppen and 
Schreiner 2014a).
Aim and Method
This report aims to find explanations of these 
injustices and logistic burdens and, based on that 
evidence, identify policy recommendations. For 
this, we go back to the colonial origins of permit 
systems and seek to decolonize the ‘wrongs’ 
of the past while perpetuating the ‘rights’. The 
post-1990 generation of water laws in SSA were 
not new or ‘modern’ at all. They were a revival 
and expansion (or for some countries, a new 
adoption2) of the permit systems introduced by the 
colonial powers from the 1920s onwards. 
This study focuses on f ive countr ies: 
Zimbabwe (where the 1927 Water Act of the 
then Southern Rhodesia combined permits and 
riparian rights); Kenya (where the 1929 Water 
Ordinance put in place Africa’s first fully-fledged 
permit system); Malawi (with partial permits for 
groundwater in 1952 in the then Nyasaland); 
Uganda (which introduced a permit system in 
1995); and South Africa (as the most recent 
country of the five to adopt a nationwide permit 
system in 1998). The total population of the 
five countries is just over 165 million3. Half to 
two-thirds of this population live in rural areas, 
making a total between 80 and 100 million people 
affected by the flaws of permit systems. 
We held policy dialogues and conducted an 
extensive review of national and international 
literature, and water policies and legislation 
that have been in place over time in the five 
countries (see Annex 1 for the laws examined). 
This included the outputs of the REACH-funded 
Water law reform to improve the water security 
of vulnerable people in Africa project conducted 
in 2017: five country reports, a synthesis report 
and an international policy dialogue (http://
pegasys ins t i tu te .org /pub l ica t ions-media /
publications/). 
The analysis focuses on permits for water 
abstraction and storage. Out of its scope are: 
water services provision, access to and regulation 
of potable water, health issues, dam safety, 
other water quality and pollution prevention 
issues, easements or servitudes, protection of 
riparian zones, soil conservation, management of 
return flows, sanitation, and transboundary water 
management. 
We use the term ‘permit’ in a generic sense. 
Other terms used in these five countries are 
licenses or water rights, but they all refer to the 
same tool. When permits (and exemptions) are 
the exclusive way for a water authority to declare 
water abstractions as lawful, the entitlements and 
obligations of permits are two sides of the same 
coin. The ‘carrot’ of receiving a state-backed 
entitlement is then used as the ‘stick’ for the 
state to impose regulation through specific use 
conditions. In the words of a Tanzanian water 
officer, “the entitlements are the ‘cakes’ and the 
conditions are the ‘spears’ of permit systems" 
(van Koppen et al. 2014). The name ‘water right’ 
emphasizes the entitlement and was commonly 
used in the past (with the exception of Kenya’s 
1929 Water Ordinance, which refers to ‘licenses’). 
The most recent round of revisions in the five 
2 In Ghana, before the shift to permits in 1996, water rights were tied to land and traditional authorities. Here, the sudden separation of water 
rights was exposed as unconstitutional (Sarpong 2004). As far as we are aware, Ghana is the only country where permit systems’ infringement 
on customary water rights was somewhat contested.
3 Kenya - 45,533,000; Malawi - 16,832,900; South Africa - 54,956,900; Uganda - 34,856,813; Zimbabwe - 13,061,239 (https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/List_of_African_countries_by_population).
3
countries emphasized the regulatory aspects 
and changed the term used to ‘permit’ (with the 
exception of South Africa, where the term ‘license’ 
is used for both water abstraction and waste 
discharge; and the 2013 Water Resources Act 
of Malawi, with a ‘license’ for water use, but a 
‘permit’ for waste discharge. A ‘license’ in Kenya’s 
2016 Water Act refers to water service provision 
and the authorization required by a water service 
provider).
Contribution to Global Debates
The present study overcomes what has been 
dubbed a ‘limbo’ in current global scholarship 
and policy debate about legal pluralism in water 
tenure (Burchi 2012). This is the tendency to 
consider customary and statutory laws as two 
parallel systems without regarding the interface. 
This tendency is manifest in the weak references 
to customary water law in a few water acts of 
countries such as Namibia, Tanzania and Malawi, 
and linked to territorial segregation in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. Customary law is mentioned as 
a separate legal sphere. As Burchi (2012, 622) 
commented:
“These statutes bear evidence of the 
awareness by lawmakers of the existence 
and significance of customary or traditional 
water rights in the field. These are dealt 
with, however, by basically separating 
them out of the mainstream ‘modern’ water 
rights regulated by statute, and by creating 
a separate legal space for them. For want 
of particulars, however, such legal space 
comes closer to being a legal limbo, which 
does not prevent the two sets of water 
rights from mutually interfering at some 
point, and from clashing eventually.” 
Obviously, it is important to first recognize 
customary water rights as having their own legal 
space and equal standing as statutory law. In 
this sense, pluralism in water tenure resembles 
legal pluralism in land or forest tenure. The claim 
that water is part of such separate land tenure 
underpins recent efforts to recognize customary 
water rights as physically and legally linked to 
customary land (Alden Wily et al. 2017). However, 
unlike the fixed space for land and forests, water 
is fugitive. The interface between customary and 
statutory law also needs to be addressed. This 
study unpacks the history of this interface, which 
leads to the proposed hybrid approach that not 
only recognizes customary law but reconfigures 
the tool of permits as well. 
This focus on the interface adds a new 
dimension to the work of scholars, indigenous 
people and a few states elsewhere. Their work 
focuses on recognizing customary water rights 
as a separate legal system with its own space, in 
particular, in colonized Latin American countries 
(Boelens 2008; Vera Delgado and Zwarteveen 
2017) and industrialized countries such as 
Canada (Burchi 2012; Jackson 2018), New 
Zealand (Jackson 2018) or the United States of 
America (USA) (Getches 2005). Self-identification 
as ‘indigenous people’ and ‘indigenous rights’ 
legitimizes a separate legal space that is different, 
but should be of equal legal standing as statutory 
rights. Proponents invoke the profound differences 
between both systems, for example, in the source 
of authority, the role of the collective or the 
perception whether or not water can be owned 
at all. Attempts to impose permit systems on 
communities governed by customary law confirm 
the need for such separation and autonomous 
space: individual permits erode the very collective 
dynamics that make customary regimes work. 
Indeed, ‘It creates chaos’ (Boelens 2008). Formal 
codification into a unitary system has been 
contested for similar reasons: it ‘freezes’ these 
dynamics. In Bolivia, where indigenous people are 
a majority, the current law provides such separate 
legal space. 
T h e  i n t e r f a c e  b e t w e e n  c u s t o m a r y 
and statutory rights has only partially been 
addressed as yet. In the USA, Canada and 
New Zealand, this is done by defining the 
space of customary rights in relation to overall 
available water resources, either to the dismay 
or relative satisfaction of the claimants. In the 
USA, for example, the allocated water resources 
were seen as sufficient. Lack of infrastructure 
remained the main bottleneck to take up the 
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rights. The statutory vested users benefit from this 
arrangement by obtaining more security for further 
investments (Getches 2005). 
Another way in which global and African actors 
engage in this interface is through procedural 
rights that should ensure that all parties are 
equally represented in negotiation and decision-
making processes about water (e.g., on mining 
pollution) (UN 2002; Malzbender et al. 2005). The 
hybrid approach addresses both procedural and 
substantive dimensions of the interface. 
The central place of this interface in the 
proposed hybrid approach is relevant in any 
agrarian setting with many scattered small-scale 
water users and relatively few high-impact users, 
but even more in SSA for the following reasons.  
First, African water users governed by 
customary rights represent a greater proportion 
of the rural population than elsewhere. Two-
thirds of the population live in rural areas and are 
governed by non-formal land tenure regimes, so 
the term ‘indigenous’ could, in theory, apply to 
all water users in these areas. However, in SSA, 
self-identification as ‘indigenous’ is limited to a 
few small ethnic groups. This may be related to 
a fear of reviving ethnicity-based categories and 
sentiments fuelled by colonizers (Mamdani 1996). 
So, this report refers to a majority of citizens. 
Second, the continent’s water scarcity 
problems and vulnerabilities to climate change 
are different and more skewed than elsewhere. 
Less than 4% of water resources have been 
developed in SSA and there is a lack of storage 
(Bahri et al. 2011). This causes conflicts in the 
dry seasons, dry spells and droughts. The top 
solution is to invest in infrastructure to sustainably 
store and convey water and make it available for 
broad-based use and protect against flooding. 
The investments of citizens in self-supply to that 
end should be formally welcomed and supported 
instead of criminalized. Conflicts among customary 
investors, including those who risk being left 
behind, should be mediated as feasible. Moreover, 
customary investments should be protected 
against foreign and national large-scale deals for 
land and the related water resources in the ‘land 
and water grabs’, which currently get the superior 
formal entitlements of permits (Franco et al. 2013; 
Borras et al. 2011). International trade agreements 
can entail even stronger claims to water resources 
than the national laws would allow (Hodgson 
2016). Ironically, in the name of their water 
security, prior and future water security of millions 
of other investors is compromised. The choice 
for equitable economic and water resources 
development should be made in the planning 
phases. Once investments have been made, the 
redistribution of raw water resources becomes 
more difficult or impossible. This is the lesson 
of South Africa, where colonial powers captured 
most water resources and the current political 
goal of redress and redistribution of water from 
the ‘haves’ to the ‘have-nots’ remains ineffective.  
Third, unlike well-entrenched legislation 
elsewhere, the moment for adjustments of 
statutory law and regulations is opportune. 
Implementation of the post-1990 round of 
revisions is still in an early phase. The laws are 
flexible. Precious implementation experiences 
have been ga ined fo r  robus t  ev idence-
based adjustments. The logistic impossibility 
to implement permit systems makes change 
a necessity, because a law that cannot be 
implemented is a weak law. As elaborated in the 
section Current Implementation of Permitting, in 
practice, water authorities already find solutions by 
targeting permits to the few high-impact users as 
a regulatory tool for caps on volumes, curtailment 
rules in case of water shortages, or pollution 
prohibition. However, monitoring and enforcement 
or change of conditions to adjust to changing 
contexts at each permit renewal is rare. Water 
authorities also realize that permit systems cannot 
perform three goals all at the same time: to 
regulate water use allocation, provide net revenue 
and provide information. For information collection, 
different and more cost-effective approaches 
are used. The cumbersome link between legal 
permitting and revenue collection even just from 
high-impact users is debated.  
Last but not least, the decolonization of 
legislation in line with rights-based approaches 
is higher on the national agendas in SSA than 
elsewhere. For example, after South Africa’s 
draft ing of a new constitution, Kenya and 
Tanzania also initiated massive debates about 
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new developmental constitutions in which human 
rights frameworks are used as references. The 
continuous state formation needs legitimacy by 
citizens and vice versa (Lund and Eilenberg 
2017). Similarly, states depend at least partly 
on the overwhelming numbers of investors in 
self-supply who vote. With timely adjustments, 
statutory water law can gain considerable 
credibility and legitimacy.
In sum, the search for all-encompassing, new, 
feasible, lean and fit-for-purpose regulatory tools 
to manage water in a public interest is already 
underway in SSA. In practice, permit systems are 
already being adjusted to ensure that water use 
effectively contributes to national goals of broad-
based economic growth, poverty alleviation and 
realizing constitutional rights. However, it is still 
a question how living customary water law can 
be recognized; how the de jure marginalization 
and criminalization of the majority of water users 
can be overcome; and how the interface between 
customary and statutory law, which evolved in the 
past, can be decolonized in the future. This report 
aims to contribute to this search for answers and 
solutions.
Living Customary Water Law
A limitation of the report is its simple reference 
to ‘living customary’ or informal, or local law. It is 
beyond the scope of this report to elaborate this 
immense range of variable and context-specific 
oral rules and practices in more detail. In short, 
as found in the literature (cf. Ramazotti 1996) and 
as adapted from a comparable categorization in 
Latin America (Boelens 2008), living customary 
water law is a negotiated blend of three core 
grounds that communities invoke in their claims 
to water. Outcomes are locally specific negotiated 
combinations of these grounds. First, the most 
common feature in the literature is the notion 
that water is given by god and cannot be owned. 
Water is a resource for sharing. Water for drinking 
purposes and livestock is a priority. Second, the 
physical connection between water resources 
and land creates socio-territorial claims to water 
resources. The third ground is the process of so-
called ‘hydraulic property rights creation’, in which 
the construction and subsequent participation in 
the maintenance of investments in individual or 
communal infrastructure creates strong rights to 
manage and use the water conveyed (Coward 
1986). Three other grounds shape these core 
principles: the first-come-first-served principle; 
transfers by marriage and inheritance or through 
barter and increasingly through sale; and force or 
violence. 
These grounds and the resolut ion of 
inevitable conflicts are embedded in communities’ 
support structures and hierarchies. Customary 
arrangements tend to avoid conflicts and foster 
consensus (Cleaver 1998), also avoiding a 
‘winner takes all’ approach. Conflicts that cannot 
be resolved at the lowest levels move up to 
higher levels. Derman et al. (2007) highlighted 
similarities between these norms and general 
human rights norms. In Zimbabwe, households 
with self-financed homestead wells or boreholes 
were morally obliged to allow many neighbors to 
also take water. This aligns with a human right 
to water for domestic use. The norm that ‘one 
cannot deny someone to feed his or her family’ 
reflects a human right to water for productive uses 
(Derman et al. 2007). On the other hand, social 
and political power relations, gender inequalities, 
and first-come-first-served principles mean that 
customary law practices do not always align with 
constitutional rights (Hellum et al. 2015). Not 
surprisingly, the report will conclude that more 
research on customary law is needed. 
Structure
The report is structured as follows. The next 
section Current Implementation of Permitting 
presents the status of permitting in 2017. The 
figures corroborate that implementation of the 
permit systems is still limited and biased towards 
high-impact users in the formal economies. The 
section Entitlements in the Colonial Era: Water 
Grab and State Building discusses the colonial 
origins and the different historical trajectories of 
water legislation in the five countries studied, and 
their gradual convergence towards fully-fledged 
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permit systems, from Kenya’s first permit system 
in 1929 to South Africa’s adoption of permits in 
1998. In this colonial era, the emphasis was on 
the claimed entitlements. The section Regulation 
to Serve the Colonial Hydraulic Mission is about 
the regulatory aspects of the earliest colonial 
permit systems, especially in Southern Rhodesia 
(later Zimbabwe) and Kenya. It unravels how the 
regulation served the colonial hydraulic mission. 
This is followed by analysis of the policy 
framings that led to the current fully-fledged 
permit systems in all five countries studied. First, 
focusing on the entitlements dimension with 
the consolidation of the marginalization of most 
citizens using water (section Post-independence 
Entitlements: Consolidating Marginalization). 
Second, discussing the regulatory arrangements 
of water allocation, provision of information 
and revenue collection, in particular the highly 
resource-intensive administration as a result of 
the massive expansion of people and resources 
covered in the permitt ing with ever-more 
restrictive conditions (section Post-independence 
Regulation: An Administrative Nightmare). The 
section Options to Decolonize Statutory Water 
Law proposes options to reconfigure statutory 
legislation into a hybrid approach that fits the 
purpose of both effective state regulation and 
binding legal protection of small-scale informal 
users’ entitlements. 
Current Implementation of Permitting
Table 1 shows that, despite growing efforts 
to implement permitting, the number of permit 
holders in 2017 comprises only a tiny fraction 
of the total number of water users (except for 
South Africa). These numbers are holders of 
approved permits. The table does not show the 
administrative burden of monitoring of compliance 
and the enforcement of permit conditions or the 
reissuing of expired permits.
Table 1 and other evidence suggest that 
permits (or the combination of ELU and licenses 
in South Africa) are biased towards formal large-
scale users. In South Africa and Zimbabwe, this 
dates from the colonial era. In South Africa, 
water uses that had been lawful under earlier 
colonial water regimes continued to be lawful 
according to the National Water Act (1998). In 
1999, immediately after the promulgation of the 
Act, all existing water use had to be registered, 
which not only provided information on water 
use, but also served as the basis for revenue 
generation through water use charges. Around 
60,000 existing water users complied, registering 
a total of around 80,000 different water uses. In 
South Africa, with its history of racially based 
capitalism, the overwhelming majority of registered 
water users are white, as shown by a study that 
used this database of registrations. It found that 
rural water abstractors, such as mines and large-
scale farmers, constitute 1.2% of all users but 
use 95% of the water (Cullis and van Koppen 
2008). In spite of the formal goal of the National 
Water Act (1998) to redress the racial inequities 
of water allocation in the past, a similar bias was 
found in the permits issued for water uptake after 
1998. Out of the 4,284 new water use permits 
issued between 1998 and 2012, only 1,518 were 
for historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs), 
with only 1.6% of the water allocated through the 
4,284 permits being assigned for these small-
scale users (DWA 2013b).
Similarly, in Zimbabwe, most permits date 
from the pre-independence period between the 
1960s and 1980s, when water management was 
controlled by the white-dominated, Unilateral 
Declared Independent Rhodesia (Makurira and 
Viriri 2017). 
In Kenya, implementation is more recent. 
By 2006, 43 years after independence in 1963, 
there were only 100 valid permits, which seems 
surprising for a country with the earliest complete 
permit system since 1929. At independence, 
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there were 30,000 European settlers, with many 
white farmers occupying the most fertile areas 
(Nilsson 2011). If, say, 10% of these were 
irrigators, there should have been at least 3,000 
water permits in 2006. It is possible that the 
earlier laws had barely been implemented and 
the databases were lost, or that most of the 
permits had been terminated or expired. So, most 
permits in Kenya are recent. The country’s Water 
Resources Management Authority distinguishes 
four categories of authorization depending on 
the risk and the impact on the water resource, 
and the related tier of the water authority for 
allocation: A, B, C and D. Category A comprises 
the smallest users, whose total volumes are 
negligible. By June 2015, 4,046 surface water 
and groundwater permits for the categories B, C 
and D had been issued. The total of 251 permits 
issued under category D (comprising the largest 
users), which is 6% of the total of 4,046 permits, 
TABLE 1. Number of permits issued and revenue collected.
 Number of permits Annual water resources   
  management charges collected
Kenya 2006: 100 2013: USD 2.9 million 
(valid abstraction permits) 2010: 250 2014: USD 3.1 million 
 2011: 300 
 2013: 1,700 
 2016 (September): 4,194 
 In addition: by 2016: 10,000 authorizations  
 Largest volume: hydropower. Out of all the permits issued for  
 other uses, a total volume of 46% is for irrigation 
 2013: permits cover 70% of abstracted surface water and  
 33% of abstracted groundwater 
 Further, the installation of measuring devices is monitored  
Malawi  2016: Maximum achieved: 
(abstraction, waste  1,033 licenses issued to 434 water users (active licenses) USD 163,550 
discharge) 1,881 licenses issued to 611 water users (sleeping licenses)  Potential total: USD 286,220 
 128 licenses of 52 users cancelled  (82% from Eskom [national 
 Total: 3,042 licenses by 1,097 water users  electricity company] and   
  large-scale sugar plantations 
  (Illovo).
South Africa  Around 2005: about 80 000 ELU/licenses for water Income for 2010: USD 23 million 
(abstraction registrations  abstraction to 60,000 unique users, of which about 8,000 
of uses before the 1998  were taking water from state infrastructure; this excludes 
National Water Act, and  waste discharge permits 
post-1998 licenses Period 1998-2016: 5,956 new licenses
Uganda 2010 (October): Fiscal year 2010/2011:  
(all permits – abstraction,  Total all permits: 491 USD 45,000 
waste discharge,  366 abstractions (232 renewals; 134 new permits) Steadily increasing to: 
drilling – new and  89 waste discharge permits (39 renewals; 50 new permits) Fiscal year 2014/2015: 
renewed) 36 drilling permits USD 166,000
 2016: total 1,320 
 43 drilling permits 
 856 permits are monitored; 72% complying (50% waste  
 discharge; 74% volume abstracted; 90% drilling) 
Zimbabwe  2000: 9,711 (largely from the colonial period 1960s-1980s) Low collection rates since 
(abstraction), including  2016: 10,799 the fast-track land reform 
inactive (so no fee  
payment) permits
Source: REACH project (http://pegasysinstitute.org/publications-media/publications/)
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comprise 98% of the total volume permitted for 
the categories B, C and D together (Shurie et 
al. 2017). Interestingly, experiences also led to 
a proposal to shift the resource-intensive task 
of revenue collection and enforcement from the 
water authority to the national revenue service 
(Kenyan Water Resources Authority official, pers. 
comm., May 2018). 
By 2017,  Malawi  had not  yet  s tar ted 
implementing the 2013 Water Resources Act, 
and still used the 1969 Water Resources Act. 
The capacity of the state to implement permits 
is extremely weak. Only temporary, one-
year licenses are being issued (Mulwafu and 
Mwamsamali 2017). The revenue collected from 
water use charges is mainly from one hydropower 
company and a sugar plantation. 
In Uganda, the water authority purposively 
concentrates its regulatory efforts of permitting 
on the few large-scale users. Revenue collection 
is  done by the nat ional  revenue serv ice 
(Kiggundu 2017). 
From a regulatory perspective, it makes 
sense to target the large-scale users first as 
they disproportionately impact on other users 
and aquatic ecosystems. They can generally be 
reached by email and they have bank accounts. 
Large-scale users also contribute the highest 
fees. In contrast, the large number of highly 
dispersed, small-scale users generally lack 
access to information (in vernacular), internet 
connections and bank accounts, while transport 
costs are high. 
The problem is about the entitlements: as 
long as permits (or ELUs) are the way to declare 
water uses as lawful, national or foreign large-
scale users have a stronger legal standing, for 
a relatively small fee compared to the benefits 
derived from the use of the water, than the 
millions of small-scale users without a permit (van 
Eeden et al. 2016). The exemption from permit 
requirements has a weaker legal standing and 
entails the risk that these water uses are ignored 
and taken away by competitors. 
In sum, this state of permitting underscores 
the relevance of the following analysis, which 
starts with the question on how these biases 
came about. 
Entitlements in the Colonial Era: Water Grab and State Building 
In the colonial era in all five countries studied, 
the goal of water legislation was to establish 
colonial ownership of water and land resources, 
and to encourage the relatively small number 
of settlers to develop water infrastructure and 
use water in support of the nascent colonial 
economy. Colonial water legislation legitimized 
this sweeping water grab. 
The water laws were rooted in European civil 
law (with permits) and the British common law 
(with the riparian regime, in which landowners 
along streams are entitled to the reasonable use 
of water from a stream or river together with 
other riparian landowners). Both derived from 
Water Grab by the Colonial State the water law that emerged around 500 before 
Christ (BC) in the small agrarian society around 
Rome. In this legal regime, water resources were 
declared as either ‘public’ or ‘private’. Public 
waters were shared and required collective 
management. However, by the end of the Roman 
Empire, some 1,000 years later, the line between 
‘collective’ management and a dictatorial Roman 
Emperor who claimed ownership of all public 
water resources was thin. In perhaps one of 
the earliest outright land and water grabs, the 
Roman Emperor declared the water resources of 
conquered tribes as ‘public’ and hence under his 
ownership (Caponera 2007; van Koppen 2017). 
In the eighteenth century, civi l  law in 
continental Europe continued this separation of 
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public and private waters. Ownership of public 
water was vested in the state, but very few water 
uses, one being navigation, were declared as 
public. The developing bourgeoisie preferred 
most water to remain under private control. In 
England, however, the riparian doctrine prevailed. 
In this regime, ownership of water resources was 
inconceivable; not even the queen could own 
water (Caponera 2007; van Koppen 2017). 
Nevertheless, one of the first actions of 
the British colonial powers in the five countries 
(together with the Dutch in South Africa) was 
to claim ownership of all water resources to 
be developed in the short term and, with the 
precautionary foresight of prospectors, water 
resources that might become useful in the long 
term (or ownership of the land and indirectly 
claiming its associated water resources, as in 
Uganda). In Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), 
Kenya and South Africa, this water grab aligned 
with territorial segregation in which settlers 
claimed the fertile, well-watered and upstream 
lands. A small group of people, mainly British, 
some Dutch and other water managers, with a 
mix of sophisticated engineering, hydrological 
and legal expertise, took the lead. With a growing 
stake in Southern Africa since the seventeenth 
century, there had been systematic exchange 
among the colonial water teams in South Africa, 
Southern Rhodesia and, probably to some extent, 
in Nyasaland (now Malawi). Some of them also 
travelled to Kenya to discuss the country’s 1929 
Water Ordinance (Nilsson 2011). There was also 
exchange with India, which included Pakistan 
and Bangladesh at the time and where British 
engineers led the design and construction of 
millions of hectares of large-scale irrigation 
schemes. 
In each of the five countries studied, the 
trajectories of this legislated water grab and the 
mix of public and private waters and elements 
of riparian rights gradually converged into unitary 
permit systems, as follows. 
In Southern Rhodesia, the 1927 Water Act 
stated: “All water, other than private water, is 
vested in the Governor’ (Rhodesia Government 
Notice No. 22). The 1927 Water Act repealed 
earlier laws (the 1898 Order in Council, 1912 
Union Irrigation Act and 1913 Water Ordinance) 
and introduced riparian rights for irrigated farming 
and permits in perpetuity for other uses. The 
current Water Act of 1998 has abolished all 
riparian rights and also sets time limits for permits. 
Kenya’s 1929 Water Ordinance issued by 
the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya was the 
first fully-fledged permit system of these five 
countries and, to the authors’ knowledge, of SSA. 
Section 4 of the Ordinance declared: “the water of 
every body of water is hereby declared to be the 
property of the Crown, and its control is hereby 
declared to be vested in the Governor in Council 
on behalf of the Crown, subject to the provisions 
in this Ordinance.” ‘Body of water’ referred to both 
surface water and water under watercourses. Any 
diversion, abstraction, obstruction, storage or use 
of these waters required a permit; only swamps or 
springs that fell entirely within the boundaries of 
land that was owned (implicitly: by a settler) was 
exempted from that obligation. 
In Nyasaland ,  the Natural  Resources 
(Amendment) Ordinance 22 of 1952 introduced 
permits for groundwater use but only in certain 
areas. The post-independence Malawian Water 
Ordinance of 1969 introduced water permits at 
larger scales for most surface water sources as 
well. The 2013 Water Act consolidates permit 
systems nationwide for both groundwater and 
surface water. 
In colonial Uganda, there was little activity 
on the part of the colonial powers around specific 
legislation to regulate the use of water resources. 
Most farming was done by African smallholders, 
which is different to Kenya, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa where the white settlers established large 
farming areas. Also, with relatively high rainfall, 
there was less demand for water management 
and irrigation than in the countries with more 
limited water resources. In the River Act of 
1907 and other legislation, the British focus in 
Uganda was primarily on it being the assumed 
main source of the Nile River (Nilsson 2011). 
Water resources were tied to land, and water 
management was regulated through the land 
laws. In 1969, section 27.10 of the Public Land 
Act claimed state ownership of water by stating: 
“All rights to the water of any spring river, stream, 
10
watercourse, pond or lake on or under public 
land whether alienated or not shall be reserved 
to the government.” The Water Statute of 1995 
introduced state custodianship of water resources 
and a fully-fledged permit system. 
In South Africa, the colonial rulers claimed 
authority over an expanding range of water 
resources from 1652 onwards. After the creation 
of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the 1912 
Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act 
entrenched the centralized power of the state in 
regulating and managing water use, along with the 
use of the riparian regime in white areas, without 
defining rights in the native reserves, which later 
became the homelands. South Africa was the 
last country of the five studied to adopt a permit 
system for abstraction in 1998, 4 years after 
the establishment of a democratic dispensation 
in 1994. In addition to the intention to regulate 
increasing competition for water, the permit 
system was also intended to be a vehicle for the 
redress of historical racial inequality in access to 
water. However, as mentioned, water abstraction 
that was lawful before 1998 remained lawful as 
ELUs under the 1998 National Water Act. Those 
who drafted the Act envisaged that such ELUs 
were to be converted into licenses either at the 
behest of the user or due to compulsory licensing. 
Under compulsory licensing, all water users in 
the targeted area are required to simultaneously 
apply for a license. While consideration must 
be given to existing claims, water may be 
reallocated without compensation in specific 
conditions. However, implementation counters 
major problems. 
As further elaborated in the next section 
Regulation to Serve the Colonial Hydraulic 
Mission, the IWRM discourse of the 1990s 
and financial support from northern donors 
and countries promoted full state control with 
permit systems as the global best practice for 
regulation, information and revenue generation. 
This convinced the governments of Zimbabwe, 
Malawi and Kenya to further revise their laws that 
already included permits to a greater or lesser 
extent towards nationwide permit systems; and 
it convinced Uganda and South Africa to shift 
from their earlier resource regimes to permit 
systems, either for all existing and new water 
uses (Uganda) or for all new and existing uses 
under specific conditions (South Africa). 
Dispossession of African Water 
Entitlements 
The early colonial water managers were aware 
of successful African (or, in the idiom of the 
t ime: ‘nat ive’) water use and governance 
systems (Ranger 1985; Phimister 1988, cited in 
Derman et al. 2007). While claiming ownership 
over water and land resources, they followed 
the British colonial model of indirect and racially 
divisive rule. Similar to the model applied in 
India (Newbury 2003), they sought some degree 
of collaboration with existing African governance 
structures, and avoided destroying systems 
that worked as long as they did not undermine 
the goals of the colonial project. Thus, the 
colonial declaration of legal control over water 
resources was, at least on paper, embedded in 
a discourse of equity, fairness and protection of 
Africans, and in other wordings that have been 
copied in each amendment and revision of the 
legislation. 
In Southern Rhodesia, the British South 
Africa Company, through section 81 of its Order 
in Council 1898, emphasized that the company 
should ensure that the “natives or tribes” have “a 
fair and equitable portion of springs or permanent 
water” (Hoffman n.d.). The 1927 Water Act also 
emphasized “due regard to the interests of the 
occupants of Native Reserves” (section 105-1). 
However, the concrete interpretation of ‘fair’ and 
‘equitable’ implied a second-class status. Africans 
were almost completely excluded from decision 
making. The authorities established new decision-
making bodies (Water Courts, River Boards or 
Irrigation Boards) and authorities in charge of 
managing ‘native affairs’. As specified in sections 
105-106 of the 1927 Water Act, it was the 
Governor’s choice whether or not to select “any 
fit person whom he may select to represent the 
interests of the occupants of any Native Reserve 
in a hearing of the Water Court or as member of 
the Irrigation Board or River Board.” 
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The ‘protection’ provided also remained 
weak: a decision on new water abstraction by 
riparian irrigators or later by permit applicants 
that might “substantially affect the water supply 
of any Native Reserve” could not be taken 
unless it was first approved by the Governor. 
However, if the Governor certified that such water 
abstraction would not ‘substantially affect’ water 
supplies in native reserves, no such approval 
was needed. As water abstraction is incremental 
and impacts are cumulative, it is unlikely that any 
single water abstraction by settlers had enough 
‘substantive’ impact on native reserves to require 
such approval.
In Kenya’s Water Ordinance of 1929, the 
protection offered was equally weak. The Chief 
Native Commissioner was one of the nine 
members of the Water Board (section 18). The 
protection offered to water used by Africans is 
defined in section 27(3). This indicated that the 
Water Board should send the notice of the plan 
“to the District Commissioner of the district which 
might be affected, who shall, if in his opinion 
the interests of any native would be affected, 
cause such native to be informed of the terms 
of the application.” As for other issues, in native 
reserves, all powers of the Ordinance should 
be exercised “subject to any laws for the time 
being in force relating to land” (section 75) 
and to the approval of the Native Lands Trust 
Board, the authority in charge of ‘protecting’ the 
rights of the natives (Nilsson and Nyanchaga 
2009). Thus, the existence of customary water 
governance was recognized in the sense that it 
was tolerated as long as it did not conflict with 
settlers’ interests. ‘Recognition’ boiled down to 
outright marginalization. 
One Single Law for Colonial State Building 
The efforts to impose one single colonial water 
legislation was a part of state building and 
vesting order among unorganized and widely 
dispersed settlers of different origins (and, in 
South Africa, just coming out of the Anglo-Boer 
War). Those who complied were rewarded by 
the water authorities who committed to protect 
settlers’ water uses that had been declared as 
being ‘lawful’ both against each other according 
to a detailed normative system and, more 
importantly, against Africans. The authorities’ 
efforts to bring settler farmers, mining companies 
and other settlers under one law were intended to 
overrule their earlier polycentric regimes. Farmers 
usually preferred riparian regimes (Nilsson and 
Nyanchaga 2009; Derman et al. 2007). Permitting 
was a stronger tool to establish state authority 
and protect entitlements. 
Kenya’s 1929 Water Ordinance set the pace: 
in addition to marginalizing African customary 
rights, any uses based on earlier rights regimes 
and laws, including those that tied water rights 
to land, had to be converted into permits within 6 
months (section 20). If this was not done within 
2 years, such uses were declared as an offence 
and unlawful. Only enclosed springs or water 
‘within any land not visibly joining streams’ and 
groundwater were exempt. 
A similar effort to bring all water-using settlers 
under one piece of legislation was made in 
Southern Rhodesia, except that riparian rights for 
irrigation were also exempted from the obligation 
to apply for a permit. 
The rewards for the settlers who complied 
with the law consisted of state backing of their 
claims according to the first-come-first-served 
principle. In Southern Rhodesia, permits were 
even permanent. In competition during drought 
years, these prior rights also determined who 
could use water (Manzungu and Machiridza 
2005). Kenya’s 1929 Water Ordinance stipulated 
that permits could be “of a fixed or open duration.” 
In both countries, once permits were allocated, the 
legislation protected these permits also against 
later investments by the water authority itself. 
Compensation was prescribed when a permit was 
significantly reduced or fully taken away for the 
sake of a public purpose (but not in the case of 
an emergency). 
Permit application procedures ensured the 
concretization of such rights. Approved plans 
had to be publicly announced for feedback. 
The applicant was required to notify the locality 
of the plans during a certain period (section 
27(2), 1929 Water Ordinance). Every rights 
12
holder, including exempted users, who might be 
negatively affected by a new water abstraction, 
was entitled to submit objections during that 
period. In Southern Rhodesia, such a rights 
holder could directly demand compensation from 
the newcomer. The amount would be set either 
by direct agreement or by the water authority or, 
if no agreement could be reached, by a body of 
appeal. State protection of prior rights boosted 
rapid investments in infrastructure on a first-come-
first-served basis. Kenya’s Water Ordinance of 
1929 stipulated similar permit application and 
objection procedures. 
Command and Control State Authority 
Structures
The laws also established the powers and 
composition of the water authority. The drafters of 
the laws ascribed major powers to the authorities 
to regulate and control water with the ability to 
impose fines and imprisonment, or both, for a long 
list of possible offences. In Southern Rhodesia 
and South Africa, specialized Water Courts were 
formed to rule on water allocations. Permits, 
where they existed, served as legal evidence in 
these courts. In Kenya, both permit allocation 
and disputes were handled by a Water Board, a 
parastatal upwardly accountable to the minister. 
Appeal procedures allowed recourse to a high 
court or, in Kenya, the Water Appeal Board.  
Decentralization was envisaged. A handful of 
staff of the water authority was realistic about its 
implementation capacity and the localized nature 
of conflict resolution in their vast colonies. The 
1927 Water Act of Southern Rhodesia provided 
for the establishment of Irrigation Boards and 
the option of decentralized River Boards (which 
would only be realized much later as part of the 
IWRM initiatives [Derman et al. 2007]). The 1927 
Water Act also recognized basin boundaries 
as the appropriate boundaries for decentralized 
management institutions. Kenya’s Water Boards 
could decentralize powers to District Water Boards. 
The laws allowed significant discretion for 
the limited staff of the water authorities, not only 
in the actions that the authority could decide to 
undertake or not, but also by allowing the state to 
specify the areas and water resources for which 
permits were required. Laws and regulations 
contained the option to designate specific 
‘controlled areas’ and ‘controlled activities’ as 
those that most urgently required state oversight. 
In so-called designated and reserved areas, 
permits were temporary and conditions were 
tighter. In addition, stringent intervention was 
possible when and where water was insufficient 
due to droughts.
Although permits became the main tool 
through which the new authority recognized 
sett lers’ water abstractions as lawful and 
deserving of the author i ty ’s backing and 
protection as a water ‘right’, this backing remained 
conditional. The new laws gave (and still give) 
power to the water authorities to change, vary, 
reduce or cancel permits, especially in so-called 
controlled areas, for controlled activities or during 
droughts and in specific circumstances. Also, 
water authorities could (and still can), in many 
cases, reduce or completely withdraw permits 
when the volume of water permitted had not been 
used for 2 or 3 years. Also, the volume of water 
allowed for abstraction could be reduced when 
less water was used than the capacity of the 
work mentioned in the permits. They could also 
reduce volumes for prioritized or exempted uses. 
The ‘opinion of the water authority’ was generally 
sufficient to legitimize these top-down actions. 
Last but not least, the main caveat in permit 
systems (at any time in history and across the 
world) remains: in no way does a water ‘right’ 
mean that the water authorities guarantee that 
the water volumes indicated on paper will be 
made available. The availability of water resources 
primarily depends on nature, particularly in areas 
with limited water storage and infrastructure as 
in Africa in the early twentieth century and even 
today. Even with significant storage capacity, 
water cannot be reliably guaranteed. At best, 
minimum quantities can be reserved and priorities 
can be set.  
The foregoing section Dispossession of 
African Water Entitlements focused on the 
entitlement dimensions of the water law: is 
the water use lawful or not? Further regulation 
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was e n v i s a g e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s 
attached to permits and other legal tools. 
The next section Regulation to Serve the 
Colonial Hydraulic Mission mainly focuses on 
Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, and explores 
how regulation of information provision, water 
allocation and revenue collection served the 
hydraulic mission.  
Regulation to Serve the Colonial Hydraulic Mission 
Technical Information 
Permitt ing provided the water authori t ies 
with considerable technical information for 
infrastructure development. In the early days 
of the hydraulic mission, infrastructure and 
domestic and productive uses were all small-
scale. Water users could apply for permits either 
as an individual or collectively, for example, by 
petitioning for a combined irrigation scheme with 
an Irrigation Board, as in Southern Rhodesia. The 
latter could then apply for government irrigation 
loans. In Kenya’s 1929 Water Ordinance, two or 
more future operators could apply for a ‘private 
project’ or a ‘community project’. While most of 
the earliest acts stipulated that pollution was 
an offence, waste discharge permits were only 
introduced later. 
For the two types of permits that were required, 
the first was a temporary or provisional permit or 
authorization of a construction plan. Highly detailed 
plans for infrastructure (‘in Indian ink’ – as in section 
23[c] of Kenya’s 1929 Water Ordinance) and 
‘workmanship’ in construction were required and 
well inspected before approval. Construction had 
to be approved before a second permit could be 
issued for factual water use, abstraction, diversion, 
storage or damming, and sometimes drainage. 
Safety criteria were also in place for large-scale dam 
construction and operation. 
These meticulously defined application 
procedures, conditions, and supervision and 
use conditions not only protected those with 
prior rights, but also served the earliest water 
authori t ies and sett lers al ike: i t  provided 
hydrological and engineering information for 
their small-scale infrastructure in often largely 
unknown areas, with unknown, unpredictable and 
highly variable precipitation. Permits were a way 
to garner, systematize and institutionalize this 
valuable hydrological and engineering knowledge 
in a context in which there were no other ways 
to collect and store such technical information. 
However, this need changed soon. Hoffman 
(n.d.) commented on the experiences with the 
1927 Water Act of Southern Rhodesia, that 
water courts’ requirement for information reduced 
once an irrigation department that collected this 
information was established. 
Allocation through Prioritization 
As mentioned, water allocation was primarily 
implemented through the process of application, 
examination and approval or rejection of permit 
applications for – at the time - new water 
abstractions. In this process, water authorities 
were to ‘consider’ a specified range of factors that 
were to influence who, in a context of competition 
for water, should receive water and for what 
purpose, rather than a concurrent other person 
or for another purpose. Among permit applicants, 
the prior date system of the first-come-first-served 
principle in Southern Rhodesia even applied 
when two investors applied for the same limited 
volume of water: the person who had submitted 
his application first to the Water Court was given 
priority. Going a step further than ‘considerations’, 
the acts or later regulations and/or policies ranked 
priorities for water allocation, including during 
times of drought and water scarcity. 
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In the 1927 Water Act of Southern Rhodesia, 
users exempted from an obligation to apply for a 
permit were so-called Primary Water Uses. These 
uses were given the highest priority, although the 
minister retained the power to change such uses 
and to charge fees for such uses. Primary use 
was defined as: ‘the use of water for domestic 
purposes and for the support of animal life’ 
(‘domestic’ used to include some gardening in 
and around homesteads). In the 1898 Order in 
Council, this was quantified at 50 gallons (~ 228 
liters/person/day). This was introduced to protect 
poor white farmers (Manzungu and Machiridza 
2005).
For all other uses, the first priority was given 
to infrastructure development for state enterprises 
such as railways, development of small colonial 
towns and hydropower. For example, in Kenya’s 
1929 Water Ordinance, ‘state’ projects took 
precedence over the other four classes of projects 
(‘public’, ‘urban’ ‘community’ and ‘private’). In both 
Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, investments in 
infrastructure by the state were further promoted 
by stipulating the legal option to reserve land and 
water for future dam building or to reserve certain 
public waters. In South Africa, state water works 
were, and still are, prioritized above non-state use 
without the requirement for a water use permit. In 
all cases, the state should compensate the losses 
borne by prior lawful water users. 
The next two priorities in Southern Rhodesia’s 
1927 Water Act reflected the outcome of the 
struggle between white farming and mining 
interests in the colony’s Gold Belt (Derman et 
al. 2007). The second highest priority was given 
to water for secondary purposes: irrigation and 
watering of stock other than farm stock. In line 
with the colonial goals, ‘economic use’ was 
further promoted: ‘If a farmer has land well suited 
for irrigation and there is a stream that can be 
economically utilized, he can acquire the right to 
use all the water for irrigation even though it may 
leave others without water except for primary 
purposes.’ The third highest priority was for 
tertiary purposes, which included the mines and 
railways. 
The 1929 Water Ordinance in Kenya was 
less explicit about prioritizing exempted or other 
uses. It stipulated that the water authority may 
‘reserve’ water for micro-scale domestic uses 
defined as ‘household and sanitary purposes, 
the watering and dipping of stock and the 
essential requirements of such farming operations 
which are not of an industrial nature’, provided 
‘such abstraction or use is made without the 
employment of works’. Handheld equipment was 
not defined as ‘works’. However, as in Southern 
Rhodesia, the water authorities retained the power 
to intervene in any water use, including for water 
uses exempted from the obligation to apply for a 
permit or prioritized water use. 
Revenue Collection
Water permits also enabled the state to collect 
revenue to finance the new water authority 
structures. The fees were part ly seen as 
compensation for the state service, and partly 
legitimized by a notion that the state  ̶  as owner 
of water resources  ̶  can request a payment for 
its use. One-off payments were introduced for 
permit applications and recurrent payments were 
charged for water use. The principle of fees as 
compensation for services delivered by the new 
state was well articulated in some instances, such 
as users’ (costly) payment for hearings in the 
Water Court in Southern Rhodesia. Section 97 
of the 1929 Water Ordinance in Kenya clarified 
this difference as follows: ‘fees’ are for services 
and ‘charges’ are for water diversion, abstraction, 
storage and use.
In summary, permit systems were rooted in 
the declaration of colonial ownership of water 
resources, categorically dispossessing Africans 
of water rights. Internally, water legislation was 
part of state building among the relatively small 
number of settlers. The legislation enabled state 
investment and stimulated settlers to invest in 
infrastructure for new water abstraction on a 
colonial first-come-first-served basis.
As discussed in the next section Post-
independence Entit lements: Consolidating 
Marginalization, in spite of very different goals 
and contexts, current permit systems sti l l 
contain most of these elements, with three 
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exceptions. First, colonial ownership of water 
resources shifted to custodianship vested in the 
independent state. Second, whereas African 
water users were initially explicitly or implicitly 
excluded, the post-independence laws included 
all water abstractors and forced them to convert 
to permits, which consolidated informal water 
users’ marginalization and criminalization, 
and increased logistic requirements (see next 
section). Third, permits were expanded to 
include all water resources with more complex 
conditions, further exacerbating the logistical 
challenges for water authorities in implementing 
what the law sets out for them to do (see 
section Post-independence Regulation: An 
Administrative Nightmare). 
Post-independence Entitlements: Consolidating Marginalization 
State Goals in Dual Economies
Since the 1920s, states and contexts have 
profoundly  changed.  Post - independence 
constitutions and state policies focus on broad-
based economic growth, poverty alleviation and 
equality before the laws and other rights-based 
approaches (Hellum et al. 2015). 
Rapidly growing populations have become 
younger, more mobile and partly urban. The race-
based and capitalist colonial minority economy 
and African agrarian societies started to mix 
into a dual economy. This consisted of, on the 
one hand, a wealthier middle class employed 
in formal capital-intensive agribusiness, mining, 
industries and services sectors with a growing 
number of poor wage workers; and on the other 
hand, a much larger segment of poor and just-
above-poor informal workers, many of whom are 
rural producers who primarily depend on water-
dependent agriculture and off-farm informal work. 
The hydraulic mission of the formal segments 
continued from the colonial period through to 
after independence. States mostly focused on 
large-scale infrastructure development, operation 
and maintenance, which primarily supported 
the expanding formal sectors as well as large-
scale irrigation and few smallholder schemes. 
Hydropower supported urban and – to a much 
lesser extent - rural electrification. African states 
that became cash strapped as a result of the 
stern structural adjustment programs of the 
1980s had to slow down investments (Mehta et 
al. 2017). The IWRM discourse shifted attention 
further away from infrastructure development 
towards regulation, as reflected in the revival of 
permit systems. The 1990s and 2000s were ‘lost 
decades’ for the hydraulic mission (van Koppen 
and Schreiner 2014b). Governments became 
more dependent on the mobilization of foreign 
public and private capital to continue a hydraulic 
mission of large-scale infrastructure. State support 
for smallholder irrigation also reduced. 
In the informal rural economies, people 
continued to invest privately in water infrastructure 
for self-supply governed by customary water law. 
Their numbers significantly increased as a result 
of various factors: rapid growth of populations 
in need of food and income, new informal and 
formal market opportunities, and the expanded 
availability of water technologies for lifting and 
conveying surface water and groundwater, such 
as polypipes for gravity flows, small petrol pumps 
or electric pumps, where electrification reached 
(Woodhouse et al. 2017). Solar-powered pumps 
will further boost expansion. Although the sizes 
of irrigated land or water-dependent enterprises 
per household are generally small and barely 
meet basic health, food security and income 
needs, the high numbers of investors render 
water investments governed by customary law a 
much more important contributor to broad-based 
economic growth than public irrigation investments 
(Giordano et al. 2012). However, these changes 
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have not been reflected in the water legislation. 
On the contrary, inequalities have widened. 
State Custodianship and Imposing 
Nationwide Conversion 
After independence in Kenya (1963), Malawi 
(1961) and Zimbabwe (1980), one change in 
the post-independence legislation was a simple 
stroke of the pen. ‘Colonial ownership of water 
resources’ was replaced by ‘custodianship vested 
in the state’ (in Kenya and the 2013 Water 
Resources Act of Malawi) or in ‘the President’ 
(in Malawi’s earlier 1969 Water Resources Act 
and still in Zimbabwe). The 1995 Water Statute 
in Uganda also adopted state custodianship. 
Finally, the post-1994 South African state also 
shifted from a combination of riparian principles, 
private groundwater, Government Water Control 
Areas, permits for forestry, and other legal tools 
to state custodianship of all water resources. For 
the new custodians, permits (and exemptions) 
continued to be the sole method to declare water 
uses as lawful. The neoliberal IWRM discourse, 
which saw water as an economic good, started 
promoting permits as the best tool for increased 
revenue collection, a welcome idea for cash-
strapped states. 
Implicitly, the shift to custodianship was 
accompanied by a second change: the target 
group of permitting expanded to include all 
citizens abstracting water above the threshold in 
Malawi, South Africa (for new water abstractions) 
and Uganda. The post-independence laws of 
Kenya and Zimbabwe continued to refer to the 
continued validity of specific laws for communal 
areas. However, by also referring to ‘everybody’, 
it remained unclear whether water abstractors in 
communal lands were obliged to apply for permits. 
The meaning of ‘everybody’ was initially 
ambiguous. In the early colonial legislation, there 
was a clear differentiation between ‘Africans’ and 
‘everybody’. Because of this comparison, it was 
clear that ‘everybody’ referred to all non-African 
settlers, who had to be brought under one piece 
of legislation as part of the young colonial state. 
In later texts, race-based connotations were 
disappearing. One of the last explicit expressions 
of racial divisions was in the post-independence 
1972 Water Ordinance of Kenya, subsidiary 
legislation, which set allowable quantities for 
exempted uses as 50 gallons (about 228 liters) 
per day per head for non-Africans (Europeans 
and Asians) or 10 gallons per day per head 
for Africans. Three years earlier, the 1969 Act 
of independent Malawi set the same 10 gallon 
quota for ‘high density’ areas, which was the 
common expression for African areas, but 300 
gallons for low density (in reality, meaning: white 
and/or middle-class) areas. After this, all post-
independence acts, revisions or newly adopted 
water laws referred to ‘everybody’ abstracting and 
using water. So, ‘everybody’ implicitly became all 
water abstractors, both prior and new users. 
In fact, even before independence, the 
colonial state may well have welcomed individual 
Africans applying for a permit. After all, such 
applicants would have recognized the legitimacy 
of the colonial powers’ self-proclaimed ownership 
of water resources at the basis of permits. For 
individual African investors, it might have been 
attractive. Permits intrinsically encourage and 
reward individual investors, one by one, to obtain 
stronger entitlements than non-permit holders. 
Hence, Africans could also have sought the legal 
backing of the colonial powers to defend their own 
water uses vis-à-vis settlers and vis-à-vis other 
Africans. The latter served the colonial goals of 
divide and rule and the weakening of customary 
arrangements. Also, Africans were still excluded 
from decision making. In any case, later revisions 
and amendments consistently refer to ‘everybody’. 
Thus, the target group of permits expanded 
from the colonial minority (de jure and de facto 
entitled to take up water and encroach on prior 
African uses) to cover the many descendants 
of the African water users who had invested in 
water since time immemorial and had deliberately 
been excluded from the formal permit system. 
Permits continued to be the primary method to 
ensure one’s water use was lawful, and granted 
greater legal protection than for those using water 
under exemptions. Entitlements remained the 
‘carrot’ enticing water users to apply for a permit, 
but now not only for new water abstractions but 
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also – supposedly – to convert all water uses 
governed under customary rights into a different 
legal system. The granting of water entitlements 
continued to be part of state building. After all, 
in the words of a water authority official from 
Tanzania (pers. comm. 2007), facing the same 
situation as the five countries discussed here: 
‘one could not exclude a majority’. However, this 
exacerbated inequalities in all five countries, as 
explained below. 
Continuing Entitlements in the Formal 
Economies
In Kenya and Malawi, the early permit systems 
continued as before without changes for foreign 
and national water abstractors in the formalizing 
(and increasingly less race-based) economies. In 
Zimbabwe, the riparian doctrine disappeared and 
colonial permits in perpetuity became time-bound 
as a measure to redress inequities from the past. 
However, the envisaged reapplication for permits 
by the pre-1998 – largely white – permit holders 
never took place. Most permits from the colonial 
era continued as before (Makurira and Viriri 2017). 
As ment ioned in  the sect ion Current 
Implementation of Permitting, in Uganda, permits 
were newly introduced in 1995. Water authorities 
have targeted those individuals and entities whose 
water use has a potentially high impact on water 
resources or other users. 
In South Africa’s 1998 National Water Act, 
after quite some negotiation and lobby by the 
vested water users, water entitlements under the 
colonial legislation, including their huge inequities, 
were recognized as ELUs. Only post-1998 water 
abstraction required permitting. The envisaged 
process of compulsory licensing, which, among 
other things, was intended to enable the redress 
of historical racial inequalities, has only been 
partially implemented in three pilot cases. In 
none of them did access to water move from ‘the 
haves’ to the ‘have-nots’. 
So, many existing formal users maintained 
their existing entitlements. Existing users without 
permits and new investors obtained stronger 
entitlements than non-permit holders through the 
administrative act of applying for a permit from a 
state apparatus that they can access relatively 
easily. As in the colonial era, their lawful water 
uses keep encroaching one by one on non-permit 
holders’ existing and future water uses. 
The tradability of permits, strongly promoted 
in the IWRM discourses that kept referring to 
Chile’s and Australia’s water markets, would 
have added an even stronger entitlement. Permit 
holders would have obtained water entitlements 
on a first-come-first-served basis at relatively low 
fees, and sell their unused water resources once 
competition had grown and there was a higher 
monetary value for water. In South Africa, the 
National Water Act (1998) included the option of 
water trading, but it has recently been superseded 
by the introduction of a ‘use it or lose it’ policy 
and a policy position to prevent all water trading. 
Section 52 or the 2016 Water Act of Kenya also 
stipulates that all permitted water that is not 
being used reverts to the state. The 2013 Water 
Resources Act of Malawi does the same, but 
allows some leasing; if longer than 6 months, it 
has to be approved by the water authority (section 
55 of the Act). However, water saved can be 
transferred – but not during a drought (section 
63). In Zimbabwe, transfer of permits is only 
possible if approved by the Catchment Council. 
Uganda’s Water Statute does not refer to any 
tradability. 
Before discussing whether and how these 
permits can still serve as regulatory tools, we 
first contrast these continued entitlements for 
large-scale formal users with the weakening 
legal standing of existing and new water users 
governed by customary law. 
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Dispossession of Prior Water Investments 
in Informal Economies
In spite of the policy intentions to redress past 
injustices (in South Africa and Zimbabwe) 
and some new moves towards rights-based 
approaches (in South Africa and Kenya4), the 
historical inequalities in rights to water for 
productive purposes have only widened. The 
existing legal tools in the legislation with the 
potential to recognize customary law in Kenya, 
Malawi, South Africa and Uganda have not 
been used. 
The general pattern is as fol lows. As 
ment ioned, whereas the ear l iest  colonial 
laws in Kenya and Zimbabwe recognized the 
existence of African customary water rights 
regimes and defined their ‘protection’, which 
meant a marginalization, the new laws de jure 
imposed that ‘everybody’ using water above 
the threshold governed by customary law was 
obliged to convert decades if not centuries of 
prior water infrastructure investments and use 
into permits. This shifted all burden of proof of 
even the mere existence of their water uses 
to the informal users. It also reduced people’s 
investment and sharing arrangements into 
passive ‘use’, and continued the colonial written 
laws and arrangements about communal lands 
(as in Kenya and Zimbabwe). Beyond the five 
countries, Tanzania is particularly illustrative 
as it seemed to recognize customary law. 
Tanzania’s Water Resources Management Act 
(2009, section 52) explicitly mentions: ‘customary 
rights held by any person or community in a 
watercourse shall be recognized and is in every 
aspect of equal status and effect to a granted 
right’. However, such rights still need to be 
recorded according to the normal application 
procedures within 2 years after the promulgation 
of the Act.  
Thus, all legislation assumed that customary 
arrangements could simply be converted into 
permits within the state’s logistic capacities and 
without eroding these arrangements. The options 
of collective permit applications exist, but they 
imply major issues of membership, elite capture, 
and conflicts between those who prefer applying 
as individuals and those applying as groups. 
Moreover, it ignores the fundamental differences 
between permits and customary law, as illustrated 
in the section Customary Water Law, for example, 
about the notion that water cannot be owned 
by anyone and as being ‘given by god’. Not 
surprisingly, in response to the obligation to apply 
for a permit and pay a fee, smallholders invoked 
that water is given by god; notions of state 
ownership were contested.
On top of shifting the burden of proof and 
imposing an impossible conversion, the legislation 
defined water users without permits as criminals 
committing an offence, unless they fall within the 
categories of exempted use. For the minority 
of colonial settlers, the strict conversion to one 
legal system served the building of a new state 
apparatus. However, in post-independence 
legislation, decades of small-scale informal 
investments were criminalized or their exempted 
use weakened relative to permit holders. This 
general pattern slightly differed in the five 
countries. 
Zimbabwe ’s current Water Act of 1998 
(section 48) continues the same wordings of 
section 105 of the 1927 Act (as in italics), only 
adjusting for the renamed institutions. 
1998: The Minister shall ‘… have due regard 
to the interests of occupants of Communal Land 
...’ (1927: Governor shall ‘… have due regard 
to the interests of the occupants of the Native 
Reserves …’).
1998: The Minister may nominate ‘any fit 
person to represent the interests of the occupants 
of any Communal land before the catchment 
council’ (1927: The Governor may appoint ‘any 
fit person whom he may select to represent the 
interests of the occupants of any Native Reserve’ 
to Irrigation Board or River Board, or Water Court 
hearing).  
4 The South African constitution (RSA 1996) refers to human rights to water and food. However, in South Africa, regulations defined this right 
to water as a right to affordable and nearby infrastructure services for domestic uses of 25 liters/per capita/per day. This is lower than a global 
consensus on the human right to water, including the rights proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO), which recommends 50 liters/
per person/per day as the minimum. Domestic water uses represent less than 1% of available water resources.
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1998: if a planned water abstraction or 
any matters ‘affecting the water supply of the 
Communal Land’ is ‘likely, in the opinion of the 
catchment council, to substantially affect the 
supply of water for primary purposes of the 
occupants of any Communal Land, approval of 
the Minister has first to be obtained’ (1927: If 
a planned irrigation scheme, or decision of the 
Water Court, will ‘substantially affect the water 
supply of any Native Reserve’, approval of the 
High Commissioner needs to be obtained first. 
But, this is not needed if the water supply is not 
substantially affected).
The protection of Primary Uses, introduced 
to protect poor white farmers (Manzungu and 
Machiridza 2005), continues for ‘everybody’, but 
is qualified: the Catchment Council can take even 
those vital waters needed for livelihoods away.  
In Kenya, the same principle with which the 
1929 Water Ordinance sought to bring all settlers 
under one law is repeated in section 7 of the 
2016 Act: ‘Upon the commencement of this Act, 
no conveyance, lease or other instrument shall 
convey, assure, demise, transfer or vest in any 
person any property, right, interest, or privilege in 
respect of any water resource except as may be 
prescribed under this Act’. Each of the subsequent 
legislations (Water Ordinance of 1929, Water Acts 
from 1973 to 2016) specified that all powers and 
functions of the Act that affect communal land 
will be exercised and performed subject to any 
written land relating to that land (Water Act 2016, 
section 138).  
Interestingly, after independence in 1963, 
the 1972 Water Act, Chapter 372, Subsidiary 
Legislation, proposed to address the new 
situation by including the option of collective 
‘community (reserved areas) permits’. County 
councils should submit such an application ‘on 
behalf of’ the concerned persons residing in a 
reserved area. Such permits ‘need not specify 
individual diversions, abstractions, obstructions 
or uses of water, but there shall be embodied 
in it a condition that all individual diversions, 
abstractions, obstructions or uses of water, not 
exceeding the total amount sanctioned, shall be 
approved and authorized by the permit holder’ 
(who needs to keep a record). This explicit option 
disappeared in later versions. However, permits 
can be obtained by ‘a body of persons whether 
incorporated or unincorporated’ (section 2). 
The 2016 Act (section 135[d]) gives, in 
principle, some room to avoid such conversion 
by declaring ‘rights existing immediately before 
the commencement of the Act’ as ‘deemed to be 
a right conferred by a permit under this Act’ by 
agreement or otherwise’. However, this option has 
not been operationalized. 
South Africa’s National Water Act (1998), 
which protects Existing Lawful Use under former 
(colonial) acts as lawful under the Act, is silent 
about the legal standing of customary water rights 
regimes within or outside the former homelands. 
Section 34 gives the option to the water authority 
to declare water uses just before 1998 as lawful, 
but this has never been used for small-scale black 
farmers or inhabitants of former homelands. So, 
the historical marginalization is reinforced. 
When the Ugandan government adopted the 
Water Statute in 1995, no existing water user had 
permits. Section 42, which stipulates transitional 
arrangements,  recognizes the cont inued 
lawfulness of works that were lawfully constructed 
in the past, but it requires their registration within 
a certain period. Without that registration, the 
lawfulness lapses and the use becomes unlawful. 
Malawi’s 2013 Water Resources Act is the 
only act of the five countries that refers somewhat 
more explicitly to customary law, but only in cases 
of others’ new applications for permits. In section 
41, which lists the ‘considerations’ during an 
approval process of permit applications for new 
water abstractions, it mentions (section 41[i]): 
‘the existence of any traditional community and 
the extent of customary rights and practices in, 
or dependent upon, the water resource to which 
an application for the license relates’; and in 
section 43(e), ‘any reasonable requirements of a 
community’. Such explicit requirement is certainly 
relevant in the case of large-scale land and water 
deals and related claims to water resources. 
However, without due process of a rigorously 
implemented process of permit application, 
notification, approval and appeal, recourse by 
affected parties is very limited. Moreover, both 
the Water Resources Act, Chapter 72: 03 of 
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1969, and the 2013 Water Resources Act require 
the conversion of any previous water use into a 
permit within 6 months (1969 Act) or 12 months 
(2013 Act). 
The legislation in the other four countries also 
stipulates ‘considerations’ that need to be taken 
into account when approving a permit request. 
However, they only refer to existing lawful uses, 
without further defining what lawfulness means. 
Section 27(b) of the South African Act refers to 
the ‘need to redress the results of past racial and 
gender discrimination’, but only as one of the 
considerations. 
Ironically, as long as permits and exemptions 
are the sole tool to declare water uses as lawful, 
one could counteract the above-mentioned 
critiques with the argument that such superior 
entitlements are finally opened up to all citizens 
abstracting water. However, that would only be 
the case if water authorities could offer equal 
opportunities to issue permits to ‘everybody’, and 
ensure equal legal standing of exempted uses. 
However, the administrative nature of permit 
systems is bound to result in unfair treatment, as 
explained below. 
Applying for permits poses signif icant 
demands on water users, who have to provide 
relevant information on their water use to the 
state. For large-scale water users with complex 
water use demands, the requirements of permit 
applications are more complex, but they generally 
have sufficient technical and financial (and 
legal) resources to be able to deal with these 
requirements. For small-scale water users, 
completing the permit applications can be 
daunting, and they face more challenges in 
accessing the offices to submit their applications. 
Therefore, th is administrat ive process is 
advantageous for administration-proficient, large-
scale water users, both nationals and foreigners, 
and disadvantageous for small-scale, rural users. 
This is unfair treatment.
Moreover, as already mentioned, exempted 
micro-scale water uses are disadvantaged even in 
Zimbabwe with the high priority Primary Uses, as 
long as these users lack effective representation 
in the Catchment Councils, which can still curtail 
such uses. 
Last but not least, even water authorities 
admit that the administrative burdens are 
so excessive that they cannot be solved 
just by throwing more resources into the 
implementat ion.  As a lso ment ioned,  the 
second edit ion of South Afr ica’s National 
Water  Resource  St ra tegy  (DWA 2013a) 
recognized that the state lacks the capacity to 
effectively provide permits even just to post-
1998 new entrants. As elaborated next, this 
is the result of the increasing administrative 
burden arising from a trend in all of the five 
countries, in which both the people and water 
resources subject to permitting expanded and, 
as a result, the conditions became increasingly 
restrictive. This trend started in the colonial 
era and intensified over time, especially in the 
post-1990s revisions. This not only inflicted 
administrative injustices on those who are most 
difficult to reach, but also prohibited effective 
implementation of fit-for-purpose, lean, credible 
and transparent regulation. The independent 
state weakened as the regulator, which widened 
inequalities even further. 
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Post-independence Regulation: An Administrative Nightmare
More Water Users and More Water 
Resources 
Over time, water authorities and global players 
increasingly put their faith in permit systems as 
tools to neatly regulate water uses. In addition 
to the above-mentioned massive expansion 
of water users across a wide geographical 
terrain subsumed under permit systems, the 
water resources and the domains for regulation 
mul t ip l ied as wel l .  Th is  added immense 
logistical burdens and further over-extended the 
administrative capability of the state to implement 
the legislation.
Each amendment and revision of the water 
legislation declared more water resources, in 
particular groundwater, as ‘public’ instead of 
private or exempted, thus requiring permits. The 
number of ‘controlled areas’ also increased. 
South Africa’s 1956 Water Act, for example, 
created Government Water Control Areas to 
be managed through permits. The same Act 
already included ‘the control of activities which 
may alter the natural occurrence of certain types 
of atmospheric precipitation’. However, it still 
largely considered groundwater to be a private 
resource till 1998. The revised and later laws 
in Kenya (Water Ordinance 1972 and Water 
Act 2016) and Malawi (Water Resources Act 
1969) already included permits for groundwater 
abstraction (but continued to exempt springs 
within land boundaries [Kenya] or private water 
defined as pans or springs within private land 
boundaries [Malawi]). In the most recent laws 
(Kenya Water Acts 2002 and 2016, Malawi Water 
Act 2013, and South Africa’s and Zimbabwe’s 
1998 Water Acts), all water resources are 
subject to permitting (or exemptions). After all, 
the principles of IWRM taught: ‘all components 
of the water cycle such as groundwater, surface 
water, evaporation, clouds and rainfall are 
recognized as being interdependent and forming 
part of a single water cycle’ (Zimbabwe 1998 
Water Act section 6.2.a). In Uganda, all water 
resources that were claimed as ‘reserved to 
the government’ in the 1969 Public Land Act 
(section 27.10) shifted to be the domain for state 
management in the 1995 Water Statute.
It is true that all laws continued to provide the 
flexibility for the state to focus on critical areas 
and resources: designated or controlled areas and 
activities, surface water or groundwater shortage 
areas, groundwater conservation areas, protected 
areas, government water control areas, dams 
above a certain storage capacity, or areas that 
are declared as ‘drought situations’ with specific 
rules for water use under drought conditions; or 
the opposite: designating areas with less strict 
controls, for example, where no groundwater 
permits are required (1998 Zimbabwe Act). 
However, little use seems to be made of this 
flexibility. 
More Regulation and Information 
Requirements of More Activities and Uses 
Permit application procedures were, and continued 
to be, resource intensive. Applications were often 
phased, requiring two subsequent authorizations 
and permits, each including a specified period for 
public notification. For example, Uganda’s new 
1995 Water Statute requires separate permits 
for works and for surface water or groundwater 
abstraction (and one-year permits for drilling 
companies). In Kenya, the obligation to apply for 
both construction and use permits also continued. 
Information requirements intensified. Permit 
holders were obliged to install devices to measure 
actual water use, and to provide information 
about such uses to the water authorities. Kenya’s 
1972 Water Act up until the Water Act of 2016 
(4th schedule, section 2) and Malawi’s Water 
Resource Act of 2013 (section 68) specified 
that anyone constructing a well should keep 
a record with ‘(a) measurements of the strata 
passed through and specimens of such strata; (b) 
measurements of the levels at which water was 
struck’; and (c) measurements of the quantity of 
water obtained [..]’. 
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The activities falling under ‘water use’ also 
expanded. For example, in South Africa in the 
1970s, when afforestation became a ‘streamflow 
reduction activity’, this required a permit as well. 
In all of the five countries, the second and later 
generations of water legislation included waste 
discharge as also requiring a permit, with a 
concomitant application fee (waste discharge had 
already required a permit in South Africa under 
the 1956 Water Act). 
Last but not least, in the latest rounds of 
revisions, the environment became a significant 
user in its own right, requiring environmental 
flows that had to be assessed, implemented 
and enforced. All current acts stipulate a high 
priority or even a reserve for environmental 
flows. For example, priority of use in Zimbabwe’s 
current catchment outline plans is based on 
the following order: primary uses, environment, 
urban, industry, mining and agriculture (Makurira 
and Viriri 2017). In South Africa, the ecological 
reserve safeguards environmental flows and 
aquatic ecosystems. Estimates of the reserve 
are at some 20% of average flow, although this 
varies from one resource to another. A specific 
reserve has to be determined for each significant 
water resource. Because of its high priority, such 
assessments were to precede the consideration 
of any permit applications to use water. However, 
in the four other countries, water resources are 
still underdeveloped, so the available water 
resources are environmental flows by definition 
and, in principle, no quantitative assessments or 
interventions are required. 
These further activities and uses required more 
hydrological, engineering and other information 
about larger and inter-basin areas than what was 
needed for the small-scale infrastructure of the 
1920s. Specialized state departments, universities, 
consultancy firms and other knowledge centers 
emerged to develop that information. Permit 
applications by the few individual investors may 
have been useful ways for the colonial water 
authorities to garner hydrological and engineering 
information, but by now an intensive legal 
procedure is probably the most ineffective way 
to collect information from users. Moreover, the 
requirement to install measuring devices and report 
on water use to the authority discriminates against 
the many informal water users who lack money for 
such meters or measuring devices (Manzungu and 
Machiridza 2005). 
Shorter Duration and Cancellation
The duration of permits has also become shorter, 
warranting faster renewal with increased logistical 
requirements. Kenya’s 1972 Water Ordinance 
reduced the duration of permits to a maximum 
of 25 years with the possibility of renewal 
(section 95). In contrast, a duration of 5 years is 
common under the 2016 Water Act. In Zimbabwe, 
permanent rights remained in force until 1998, 
after which all permits became temporary. In 
general, permit durations under the current 
legislation vary from 2 years but ‘generally not 
more than 5 years’ (Uganda) to not more than 40 
years (South Africa). 
In theory, shorter durations increase the 
state’s regulatory powers, as each obligatory 
renewal offers an opportunity to change permit 
conditions. As indicated above, in Zimbabwe, 
the shift from permanent to temporary permits 
was expected to serve the goal of freeing up 
water used by former colonists for more equitable 
distribution. However, the many inactive permits 
in today’s database in this country highlight that 
the expectations of stronger control have not been 
met (Makurira and Viriri 2017). 
Water authorities have the option to vary or 
completely cancel a permit that is not used as 
agreed in its conditions (e.g., in Kenya’s 2016 
Water Act [section 53] and Malawi’s 2013 Water 
Resources Act [section 51]). If cancelled or 
varied for a public purpose, compensation has 
to be paid. If applied, this option also requires 
considerable administrative resources.
Lower Thresholds of Exemptions 
As shown in Annex 2, there was also a decline 
in the thresholds of the exemptions from the 
obligation to apply for a permit, as for domestic 
uses, and ‘non-commercial’, ‘subsistence’, 
23
‘household’ micro-scale productive uses. A 
startling example of this tendency to tighten 
exempted uses is South Africa. Here, the Water 
Act of 1998 introduced General Authorizations as 
another tool, besides the exempted de minimis 
uses called Schedule One uses, to exempt water 
users from the obligation to apply for a permit. 
General Authorizations can be declared for a 
specific water resource or for a certain water 
user category. While no permit application is 
required, generally authorized users may be 
obliged to register their water use and to pay 
fees. At the time, the rationale was to reduce 
the state’s administrative burden for uses of 
relatively ‘negligible’ quantities in areas where 
sufficient water resources are available. So, in 
less water-stressed catchments, the thresholds 
can be higher. However, in 2016, a newly 
gazetted General Authorization further reduced 
the authorized quantities in stressed basins to 
a volume that corresponds to 0.2 ha of irrigated 
area for abstraction of surface water. This is even 
lower than the common interpretation of exempted 
so-called Schedule One uses of about 1 ha 
(Schedule One is not formally quantified). 
Revenue Collection
As mentioned, in line with the global IWRM 
discourse since the 1990s and in response 
to structural adjustment programs, payment 
for permit applications and for water use was 
revived and expanded as a new condition of 
water use. South Africa is the only country that 
clearly specifies the services in return for that 
levy by calling it a ‘water resources management 
charge’ on all registered water use (it also has an 
infrastructure charge for users who receive their 
water via state-owned infrastructure). The water 
resources management charges for small-scale 
black users are incrementally introduced over a 
five-year period. Other countries are less clear 
about the grounds. Suggesting ownership, the 
subsidiary legislation of Malawi’s 1969 Water 
Resources Act even called the annual payment 
for a water right a ‘rent’. The 2013 Water Act of 
Malawi continues to differentiate between payment 
for ‘services provided by a public agency’ (section 
119[a]), charges for licenses for abstraction 
and use (section 119[b]), and permits for waste 
discharge (section 119[c]).   
Whatever the name, administrative burdens 
increased. Charges are also levied on those using 
relatively small amounts of water under permits or 
general authorizations. This does beg the question 
as to whether the revenue generated from these 
small-scale users is higher than the costs of billing 
these users and collecting revenue from them. 
This question of sound public administration does 
not appear to have been explored.
In sum, the foregoing showed the hugely 
increased administrative burdens in the issuing 
of permits of a shorter duration to a wider 
range of people for all of the nation’s water 
resources and their expanded uses, activities 
and information requirements, with the additional 
tasks of revenue collection. This would have 
required significant institutional decentralization 
and strengthening, especially when international 
donors who initially provided funding support for 
institutional strengthening reduced their funding. 
However, such institutional strengthening hardly 
happened either. 
Under-resourced Water Authorities 
For law implementation, the latest rounds of 
law reforms stipulated some decentralization of 
the highly centralized water authorities. Some 
of the post-independence legislation revitalized 
the decentralization of water management 
and regulation to the catchment level, as had 
already been referenced in earlier legislation. 
In Zimbabwe, for example, the 1998 Water 
Act stipulated that permit allocation by the 
national Water Court was to be decentralized 
to seven participatory Catchment Councils, 
which, being based on catchment boundaries, 
crossed the historical boundaries of territorial 
segregation. River Boards transitioned into 
sub-catchment councils in charge of monitoring 
and fee collection. Sub-catchment councils are 
represented in the catchment councils. Water 
managers employed by the Zimbabwe National 
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Water Authority provide a secretariat function to 
each of the councils. 
In Kenya, the decentralization of the issuing 
of permits to districts under the 1929 Water 
Ordinance continued under the new legislation 
to basin-level structures. However, the delayed 
revision of the water legislation, and the changes 
in government arrangements (mainly as a result 
of the introduction of county governments under 
the 2010 Constitution), resulted in some confusion 
over the roles and responsibilities of different state 
bodies for water management.
As mentioned, Uganda had no centralized 
water authority and had just created local 
government structures when it introduced a 
permit system in the 1995 Water Statute. Its 1999 
Water Policy builds its water management around 
the decentralized local and district governments 
and their bylaws and local leadership, elders and 
other customary water arrangements. Issues that 
cross the district boundaries were to be addressed 
through higher-level coordination, for example, 
with the allocation of specified water flows to the 
districts concerned. In the longer term, it was 
also foreseen that local government would issue 
permits. However, this proposed decentralization 
has been overtaken by the creation of four Water 
Management Zones into which the country has 
been divided.  
The 2013 Water Act of Malawi envisages 
the possibility of the establishment of catchment 
agencies. Under this clause, the Shire River Basin 
Organization is currently being established, with 
support from the Shire River Basin Management 
project (Mulwafu and Mwamsamali 2017).
South Africa’s National Water Act (1998) 
made  t he  es tab l i shmen t  o f  Ca t chmen t 
Management Agencies (CMAs) possible (but 
not mandatory), with the potential, if the function 
is delegated by the Minister, to issue permits. 
However, by 2016, only two of the nine intended 
CMAs had been established and permitting 
remains a function of the national department. 
The logistical burdens of centralized permit 
systems are well illustrated in South Africa. The 
requirements for processing a permit application, 
including the need for determination of the 
ecological requirements in the affected water 
resource, resulted in lengthy delays in finalizing 
applications, in some cases up to 8 years. As a 
result, the Department of Water and Sanitation 
had to put in place a special project to address 
the significant backlog in water use permit 
applications. A requirement has also been put 
in place for the maximum time allowed for the 
processing of a water use permit application to be 
300 working days. 
Obviously, in any of the countries, the 
fact that responsible water users, who try 
to comply with conditions of submitting their 
completed forms, do not get a prompt state 
response for months if not years undermines 
the legitimacy of the state as regulator in the 
public interest. However, a rushed issuing of 
permits undermines the regulatory power of 
permits and continues the marginalization of the 
non-permit holders who cannot and need not be 
reached.   
We now turn to exploring answers to the 
pertinent question: what options exist for a 
reconfiguration of water use authorization into a 
lean tool for effective regulation and sustainable 
revenue generation that supports national goals 
and builds on the current implementation practices 
described in the section Current Implementation 
of Permitting? 
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Options to Decolonize Statutory Water Law
Water Use Prioritization to Achieve 
National Goals
A proposed option is a hybrid approach which 
combines, on the one hand, the strict regulation 
of the few high-impact users with the strongest 
impacts on water uses and aquatic ecosystems 
through targeted permits; and on the other hand, 
the legal protection and further development 
of customary investments and water sharing 
arrangements of small-scale users. The targeting of 
permits resembles Kenya’s differentiation between 
categories A, B, C and D, with most efforts 
directed at the relatively small number of high-
impact category D users. In practice, South Africa, 
Uganda, Malawi and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe 
(Manzungu and Machiridza 2005) also primarily 
focus on the few high-impact users, although without 
the formal categorization as in Kenya. A hybrid 
approach goes further: it replaces entitlements 
through permits by prioritization. In order to achieve 
such prioritization, permits are targeted and living 
customary law becomes the starting point to 
encourage private infrastructure investments and 
mediate in conflicts among the other water users.
The most important change of a hybrid 
approach is the ending of the past ‘wrong’ 
that permits gave stronger entitlements than 
water uses by non-permit holders, which led 
to the concentration of entitlements among the 
few high-impact users, and the criminalization, 
marginalization and unfair treatment of the small- 
and micro-scale water users. Water allocation 
stops being dictated by the division between 
permit holders and non-permit holders. Instead, 
water users governed by customary rights have 
an equal legal standing as permit holders; water 
allocation aligns with state goals of broad-based 
economic growth, poverty eradication, employment 
creation, and the realization of constitutional 
commitments to equal treatment before the law 
and the progressive fulfilment of everybody’s basic 
human needs. 
Water allocation can contribute to achieving 
such goals by prioritizing uses of water as an 
intrinsically shared resource crossing plural water 
rights regimes. Such prioritization applies to all 
water users and hence overcomes remnants of 
past territorial and institutional segregation. When 
water resources are still plentiful, prioritization 
guides state investments in storage and 
conveyance infrastructure so that, ultimately, water 
resources will be distributed according to national 
goals. In times and areas of water scarcity during 
droughts, prioritization guides water allocation and 
conflict resolution. When most water resources 
have already been developed and distribution is 
a zero-sum game, as in parts of South Africa, 
prioritization is critical to guide conflict resolution 
and any new water abstractions. 
Constitutional rights to water, health and 
food provide the main yardst ick for such 
prioritization, as also promoted in national5 and 
international debates (Hellum et al. 2015; HLPE 
2015; van Koppen et al. 2017b). These binding 
commitments highlight an absolute priority for 
access to sufficient water for domestic uses 
and also for food production, where people are 
dependent on growing at least a portion, if not the 
entirety, of their food for consumption or growing 
sufficient crops for sale which will provide an 
income to buy food. Small-scale water users who 
mobilize capital, skills and labor for infrastructure 
development using their own money, and who are 
lifting themselves out of poverty at no cost to the 
tax payer, should certainly be encouraged, also if 
this means that wealthier users have to give up 
some of their water allocation. 
Water legislation, regulations and policies 
include tools for prioritization, which should be 
adjusted to reflect the above-mentioned national 
goals. In all the five countries studied, a high 
priority is given to water for domestic uses, but 
small-scale productive use is not supported 
as yet, on the contrary. The legislation ranks 
broad sectors without considering intra-sectoral 
5 Kenya’s 2016 Water Act declares the human right to clean and safe water in section 63, which falls under water services. In theory, this could 
be interpreted to include water services for small-scale productive uses as well.
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differentiation, local contexts and the fact that 
many rural people need water for both domestic 
and productive uses. In particular, smallholder 
agriculture, which is the mainstay of many of 
the rural poor, is considered together with large-
scale irrigators under the umbrella of ‘agriculture’, 
ignoring the importance of small-scale farming for 
basic livelihoods. The priority given to ‘agriculture’ 
has rapidly fallen since the 1990s. 
A best-practice strategic prioritization is 
formulated in the second edition of the National 
Water Resource Strategy of South Afr ica 
(DWA 2013a). This gives the highest priority 
to the ecological and basic domestic human 
needs reserve, followed by water to meet 
international obligations. The third priority is 
then given to “the allocation of water for poverty 
eradication, the improvement of livelihoods of 
the poor and the marginalized, and uses that 
will contribute to greater racial and gender 
equity.” Such water uses are given a higher 
priority than water allocation to the fourth priority: 
strategic uses, which are primarily for coal-fired 
electricity generation. The fifth priority is given 
to permitted water uses for other economic 
purposes (DWA 2013a: 47). This prioritization 
should have informed the allocation of new 
water entitlements, as well as the restrictions 
imposed on water use during periods of drought. 
Unfortunately, however, these strategic priorities 
have not been operationalized into the water use 
authorization system in South Africa, neither in 
the prioritization considerations of the National 
Water Act nor in other tools. Indeed, there is 
even little awareness of this prioritization among 
water users and officials. 
The only binding legal tool for prioritization 
is the ‘reserve’, for which the state commits to 
ensure the availability of the required volumes. 
Currently, environmental flows and water for basic 
domestic uses are reserved in that manner. The 
option to include basic productive uses in such a 
reserve should be further explored.   
We now turn to the legal tools to implement 
such prioritization and regulate high-impact 
users (see section Permits to Regulate High-
impact Users), while customary investments, 
water sharing arrangements and small uses are 
legally protected and further developed as key 
to conflict resolution (see section Recognizing 
Customary Law). 
Permits to Regulate High-impact Users
New Abstractions by High-impact Users 
The ‘right’ of permit systems is that permits with 
strict enforced conditions are an effective tool 
to regulate water use if they are targeted at 
those uses with the highest impacts. In Kenya, 
for example, the Water Resources Authority 
used the permit application process to oblige 
new high-impact users to develop their own 
storage instead of abstracting water from streams 
(Kenyan Water Resources Authority official, pers. 
comm., May 2018). 
Due process in the permit t ing of new 
water abstractions by high-impact users also 
ensures that existing uses are considered and 
small users are protected. In the five countries 
studied, the legislation dealing with this process 
prescribes such consideration. As mentioned 
above, the Malawian Water Resources Act 
(2013) (sect ion 41[1])  expl ic i t ly refers to 
traditional communities, and customary rights 
and practices that need to be considered. Other 
countries should follow this example and also 
clarify whether the interpretation of ‘existing uses’ 
includes small-scale uses or uses governed by 
customary water law. 
Due process requires the state to take 
back the burden of proof of such existing 
customary uses. The legally required public 
part ic ipat ion process should ensure that 
those affected can express objections to a 
proposed infrastructure development and water 
abstraction. Accessible and understandable 
information to evaluate the plan should be 
provided proactively to all users so that they 
can submit objections and, if need be, appeal. 
Without such proactive support, the permitting 
process will be easily abused to suggest a 
legitimacy that, in reality, serves the interests 
of high-impact users in the same way as has 
been happening since the 1920s.  
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Amending and Converting Existing Water Use 
Entitlements of High-impact Users
The same due process should hold for the review, 
amendment or renewal of permits or for the 
conversion of existing high-impact uses into 
permitted uses, which can be accompanied by a 
redistribution of water resources. The legislation 
in both South Africa (National Water Act 1998 
sections 43-48) and Kenya (Water Act 2016, 
section 47) includes the option of such compulsory 
permitting, under which all existing and new users 
in a certain area or water source are obliged to 
reapply or apply for a permit. In South Africa, the 
newly elected democratic government saw this 
as a tool to rapidly convert existing lawful uses 
under the previous legislation into more equitable 
water use authorization. It took nearly 20 years 
for a very resource-intensive, nationwide process 
of verification and validation of existing uses 
to be conducted as a first step in preparation 
for compulsory licensing. However, except for 
three small pilot projects, later steps have not 
been applied and there has been no change in 
the ‘lawful’ inequities of those pre-1998 uses. 
Moreover, a blanket approach to compulsory 
permitting would continue to intrinsically marginalize 
small- and micro-scale users because of the 
reasons discussed in this report.  
Challenges of Revenue Collection
From a financial perspective, it makes sense only 
to target higher impact users who generate a 
revenue that is higher than the costs of billing and 
collection. Charging fees for the disproportionate 
use of a scarce national resource is legitimate. 
Imposing charges on small-scale water users 
may, however, impose relatively higher costs 
on these users as in, for example, Uganda, 
where payment can only be made in Kampala. 
Water use pricing strategies are flexible and can 
differentiate among geographical areas, categories 
of water users or individual water users, and 
take social equity into account. Well-designed 
and enforced volume-based pricing discourages 
wasteful water use, while also generating a 
net revenue for water resources management. 
Revenue collection could also be made more 
efficient if the water authority continues to provide 
information and set tariffs, but if the enforcement 
of revenue collection is shifted to the specialized 
national revenue collectors, as implemented in 
Uganda and under discussion in Kenya.
In this way, the targeting of regulatory permits 
and fees at the high-impact users is justified and 
feasible. It implicitly protects other users. The next 
question is how to further recognize, respect and 
protect the water use of small- and micro-scale 
users and their customary arrangements without 
applying the discriminatory tool of water permits.
Recognizing Customary Law 
The other side of the coin of decolonizing water 
law is the de jure recognition of the many existing 
and future medium-, small- and micro-scale users 
governed by living customary law at equal legal 
standing as permitting with or without registering. 
Banks need to be informed of this formal legal status; 
permits stop being a necessary condition for a loan. 
One way of giving such recognition is through 
the tool of Kenya’s Water Act of 2016: an existing 
water use can be declared as lawful ‘by agreement 
or otherwise’ (section 157[d]). Another way to 
vest formal legitimacy of both existing and new 
uses is by drastically raising the thresholds for 
permit exemptions. The tools for this exist in most 
countries, but have not been used to that end (e.g., 
for South Africa’s General Authorization). Malawi’s 
Water Resources Act (2013) also states that the 
‘Water Resources Management Authority may 
exempt [..] a class or persons or works [..] as it 
may deem fit’ (section 45). Similarly, section 19(b) 
of Uganda’s 1995 Water Statute stipulates that a 
class of persons or works may be exempted on 
conditions that the minister may deem fit. 
The legal standing of such exemptions 
needs to be declared to be – at least – equal 
to permits and to fol low the priori t ization 
framework. The argument for exemptions should 
stop being that these uses are ‘negligible’ so 
can be ignored in regulation. On the contrary, 
the small volumes allocated in this way are 
often vital for fragile livelihoods and align with a 
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prioritization framework to realize national goals 
and constitutional rights. Zimbabwe’s Primary 
Uses have such a priority to a large extent. 
The threshold should be high enough to 
end the administrative injustices faced by users 
whom the state cannot reach and are, therefore, 
declared as criminal. When water authorities’ 
implementation capacit ies increase in the 
future, they can expand the group targeted for 
registration, revenue payment and due process 
for new water abstraction.
‘Recognition’ implies that states accept the 
burden of proof and collect relevant information 
about these uses, among others for the above-
mentioned due process during new permit 
applications by high-impact users. Many cost-
effective information collection methods exist, 
such as surveys, remote sensing and information 
exchange among government departments. 
Collective permits may play a role to protect 
groups against external competitors. However, 
delineation of ‘the’ collective, membership issues 
and the likely exclusion of some inhabitants sharing 
the same source may create more problems 
than it solves. Instead of imposing new forms of 
organization, living customary norms and conflict 
resolution arrangements are used as the entry 
point for officials’ roles as mediators, guided by the 
above-mentioned normative framework to achieve 
constitutional and other state goals.  
Obviously, customary water law is not 
without problems and may infringe on certain 
constitutional requirements. Rapid uptake of 
pumping can dry up rivers that used to flow. 
Women and more vulnerable men are often 
excluded. Conflicts arise in water-scarce areas. 
In case of conflicts, there is likely to be a need 
for mediation, in which existing customary 
institutions and conflict resolution arrangements 
provide indispensable support to state institutions, 
including local government officials, elected 
representatives and others. 
Conclusions
This report set out to identify lean, feasible 
and fit-for-purpose regulatory tools for water 
allocation, information provision and revenue 
generation that finally recognizes an independent 
space for customary water investments and 
sharing arrangements. While global debates 
primarily focus on the bottom-up need for such 
independent space, we focused on both bottom-
up customary law and top-down statutory permit 
systems, and on their interface. The focus on 
this interface generated insights into the ways in 
which permit systems were introduced to serve 
the colonial water grab and minority economy, and 
to marginalize African water law. The study of the 
interface also highlighted the post-independence 
forms of even stronger criminalization and 
marginalization of customary water investors and 
the water sharing arrangements of the millions 
of small-scale users who simply cannot be 
reached logistically. Their entitlements vis-à-vis 
the relatively few formal high-impact users further 
weakened. 
At this interface between plural water laws, 
colonial state formation and claims to water 
resources went hand in hand. State formation 
and state-backed claims to natural resources 
continued to be intertwined, which called for a 
decolonization that strengthens accountability to 
the majority of voters and state legitimacy. The 
proposed hybrid approach fills that void. 
In the hybrid approach, statutory water 
legislation removes the ‘wrongs’ of colonial water 
law and reconfigures the ‘rights’. The ‘wrong’ of 
the past is that permits (or exemptions) are the 
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primary way for any users to be recognized as a 
lawful water user. Instead, water allocation should 
follow a prioritization in line with national goals. 
The ‘right’ of permits as tools for regulation should 
continue as a lean tool without any superior 
entitlement targeting the limited state capacities 
at the relatively few large-scale users with the 
strongest negative impacts on other uses and 
the environment. This hybrid approach is in line 
with current practice, which Kenya formalized 
as a categorization according to impact and the 
strongest focus on the high-impact users. 
The role of states vis-à-vis the many other 
users profoundly changes from unrealistic 
logistical burdens and policing of non-permit 
holders to ending the de jure injustices inflicted on 
these users. Legal tools to that end are available 
and can be used, for example, by declaring 
certain existing water uses as deemed to be 
lawful or raising the thresholds of exemptions and 
ensuring equal legal standing. 
This reconfiguration finally opens the space 
to recognize customary law, and welcome and 
support local investments in water infrastructure 
in l ine wi th the state’s pr ior i t izat ion and 
constitutional requirements. In concrete cases 
of conflicts, water authorities can mediate and 
build on existing water sharing and conflict 
resolution arrangements. Instead of being 
entangled in concerns of getting a permit or not, 
the overdue concerns become:  what are the 
ultimate goals that communities and states want 
to achieve through the regulation of precious 
water resources, and how best can that be 
realized? How can customary arrangements 
contribute to that? 
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Annex 1. Water Legislation Examined for this Report.
Kenya 1903 Water Rules
 1929 Water Ordinance. Ordinance No. 35 of 1929 to make provision for the employment  
 and conservation of waters, and to regulate water supply, irrigation and drainage.  
 Ordinances enacted during the year 1929. Colony and protectorate of Kenya. Nairobi:  
 Printed by the Government Printer 1930
 1952 The Water Act, Chapter 372 
 1962 The Water Act, Chapter 372 Revision 
 (1963 Independence) 
 1972 The Water Act, Chapter 372 Revised Edition 1972 (1962) 
 2002 Water Act, Chapter 372; revised in 2012
 2016 The Water Act
Nyasaland/ Natural Resources (Amendment) Ordinance 22 of 1952 
Malawi  (1964 Independence) 
 1969 Water Resources Act, Chapter 72:03
 2013 Act No. 2 Water Resources Act (not yet operationalized)
South Africa 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Water Act
 1913 and 1936 Territorial Segregation in Land Acts 
 1956 Water Act (No. 54 of 1956)
 (1960 Republic of South Africa created) 
 (1994: Full democracy)
 1998 National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998)
Uganda 1907 Rivers Act, Chapter 357
 Water included in land legislation 
 (1962 Independence)
 1964 The Water Works Act, Chapter 137
 1969: Public Land Act: Water on or under land reserved to government
 1995 Water Statute No. 9, Statutes Supplement No.7 
 1997 The Water Act Cap. 152
 2998 The Water Resources Regulations No. 33/1998
Southern Rhodesia/ 1912 Union Irrigation Act
Zimbabwe 1927 Act No. 22. Water Act to consolidate and amend the law in respect of the  
 ownership, control and use of water 
 1930 Territorial Segregation in Land Apportionment Act 
 1947 Water Amendment Act
 1976 Water Act, Chapter 20:22
 1977-1996 Revised editions 
 (1980 Independence)  
 1998 Water Acts 31/1998, 22/2001, 13/2002, 14/2002
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Annex 2. Trends in Exempted Uses over Time. 
This Annex lists the uses and users that are exempt from the obligation to apply for a permit and their 
prioritization (if any) over time.
 First colonial water laws Trends over time   Legislation 2017 
Kenya 1929 Water Ordinance  Cap. 372 in 1972 2016 Water Act 
 Domestic uses are defined  Domestic purposes Domestic purposes (which is not further 
 as ‘household and sanitary  defined as ‘household defined) without the employment of works 
 purposes, the watering and  and sanitary purposes, for persons with lawful access to the 
 dipping of stock and the  the watering and dipping source, and for springs within land 
 essential requirements of  of stock (section 35) boundaries, or small storage (but state 
 such farming operations  (provided without the may require a permit or otherwise 
 which are not of an  employment of works) regulate) (section 37). 
 industrial nature’. Provided  (section 38). Hand 
 ‘such abstraction or use is  utensils were not Domestic uses take precedence over 
 made without the  defined as ‘works’. other uses. The authority may reserve 
 employment of works’  The use of water for such quantities as, in its opinion, is 
 (section 7[a]). Hand  domestic uses shall take required (section 43[1]). 
 utensils are not defined  precedence over other 
 as ‘works’.  purposes and the water The reserve includes ‘basic human needs 
  apportionment Board and aquatic ecosystems’; it is not 
 The Water Board ‘may  ‘may reserve’ such part specified whether basic human needs 
 reserve’ these quantities  of body of water’ only refer to domestic uses or also small- 
 for riparian land (section 8).  (section 82). scale productive uses that contribute to 
   constitutional basic rights to food and 
  Subsidiary legislation  income. 
  form no. W.A.B. 13 sets  
  allowable quantities: 50  
  gallons per day per head  
  for non-Africans  
  (Europeans and Asians),  
  and 10 gallons per day  
  per head for Africans.  
 
  2002 Water Act: domestic  
  purposes, provided  
  without the employment  
  of works (but a permit  
  may be required).  
 
Malawi  No data   1969 Water Resources  2013 Water Resources Act (still being 
  Act  operationalized) 
  Right to take public water  Domestic uses are defined as: ‘water for 
  without ‘works’ for  household and sanitary purposes and for 
  domestic purposes  watering and dipping of stock (less than 
  (section 6). 30 livestock units); irrigating a 
  Domestic purposes  subsistence garden (defined as less than 
  defined as: ‘water for  0.5 ha, at homestead, and primarily for 
  household and sanitary  own consumption); and watering a 
  purposes and for  subsistence fish pond’.  
  watering and dipping  
  of stock’.  Definition of ‘works’ excludes: hand-dug 
  Definition of ‘works’ borehole; borehole less than 10 m; and 
  excludes hand dug well.  rainwater harvested on own or communal 
  The Board may direct  land. 
  otherwise and limit the  
  number of stock.  
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  Normal quantities per  The Water Resources Management 
  day for household use:  Authority may exempt [..] a class or 
  low density 300 gallons;  persons or works [..] as it may deem fit 
  medium density 50  (section 45). 
  gallons; high density 10  
  gallons (schedule A)  
  (note: low density  
  commonly referred to  
  settlers; high density to  
  Africans).    
South Africa 1912 Irrigation Act 1956  Water Act 1998 National Water Act 
 (no data). The minister may  Schedule One: 
  exempt a person or  Reasonable domestic use: 
  category of persons.  (ii) small gardening not for commercial  
   purposes; and 
   (iii) watering of animals (excluding   
   feedlots); roof water harvesting; and  
   firefighting.
   General Authorizations for a resource or  
   category of people (section 39).  
   The minister may change. 
   Reserve: for ‘basic human needs’, which  
   are defined in regulations as 25 liters/ 
   person/day. 
Uganda No water act. No water act. 1995 Water Act Cap. 152 
   Section 7 General rights to use water (but  
   no authorization to construct any works)  
   for:  
   •   Domestic uses, firefighting or irrigating  
    a subsistence garden (section 7b).  
   • Water under the land occupied or  
    residential (with approval from the  
    authority).
   Domestic uses defined as water for   
   human consumption, washing and   
   cooking by persons ordinarily resident  
   on the land where the use occurs;  
   watering not more than 30 livestock;  
   irrigating a subsistence garden (defined  
   as not exceeding 0.5 ha, near residency  
   and predominantly consumed, not sold or  
   bartered); and watering a subsistence fish  
   pond. 
   Works is defined in regulations section  
   10: motorized or able to convey/impound  
   400 m3 or more per 24 hours.
   Minister may set a range of conditions on  
   any water use.
   Water Policy 1999. Priorities:  
   (i) Domestic demands, (ii) other   
   uses including water for production   
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   (agriculture, industry, hydropower) to  
   be based on economic, social and   
   environmental values of the water (most  
   beneficial use). For watercourses,  
   provision of a minimum flow to maintain  
   water quality and aquatic ecosystems.
Zimbabwe Order in Council, 1898  1976 (1996 revised 1998 Water Act, Chapter 20:24, amended 
 and 1927 Water Acts,  edition) Water Act, in 2002:  
 and 1947 amendment: Chapter 20: 22
 Priority for primary water  Primary water uses by Primary water uses by everyone (section 
 uses (for human use,  the riparian landowner, 32) (Primary water uses are defined as: 
 gardening in and around  lessee or occupier. reasonable uses for basic domestic 
 homestead, and farm   human needs in/around residence, animal 
 livestock at 50 gallons  Primary water uses life [no fish or feedlots using 10 m3 per 
 [~228 liters] per person  are defined as: day or more], private brick-making, 
 per day) over secondary  reasonable uses for dipping).  
 and tertiary uses.  human use,  
  homestead garden,  However, the Catchment Council may 
  cleaning, animal life  limit quantities used or the number of 
  (no fish or feedlots  livestock for primary purposes (section 
  using 12 m3 per day  33).  
  or more), private brick  
  making, dipping.  When constructing storage of less than 
  Set at 50 gallons  5,000 m3 for primary uses, the user needs 
  (228 liters) per person  to notify those affected and the 
  per day.  Catchment Council, and resolve conflicts 
  However, the minister  through the Catchment Council (section   
  may limit quantities  32.2). 
  used for primary   
  purposes (section 35).  For sinking a borehole for primary 
   purposes, a written authority needs to be 
  When constructing  obtained from the Catchment Council. 
  works for primary uses,   
  the riparian owner  No other permits shall deprive 
  needs to notify those  primary uses. 
  affected and resolve  
  conflicts through the  
  Water Court (section  
  34.2).
  Casual uses of public  
  water (cooking, drinking  
  or washing; or use in a  
  vehicle or for watering  
  stock) (section 33).
  Landowner or occupier  
  can abstract groundwater  
  of that land (section 63),  
  but needs to report if  
  deeper than 15 meters  
  (section 65) or otherwise  
  as required by minister  
  (section 66).   
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